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 Constraints to achieving effective and sustainable WASH in DRC highlight a lack of 
complementarity between humanitarian and development interventions, rather than 
a ‘gap’ between them.  
 Nonetheless there are opportunities to achieve greater complementarity at both 
strategic and operational levels.  
 Efforts to support complementarity at national level could have strategic impact and 
include: providing flexible financing options rather than binary humanitarian / 
development funding; and documenting and sharing experience of WASH 
interventions more systematically to identify the conditions under which certain 
approaches work and others do not. 
 At sub-national level, we recommend that humanitarian and development actors 
develop and agree on ‘Common Principles for WASH in Crisis’, finding operationally 
focused middle ground between practical and ideological differences. In DRC, such 
principles should be deliberated and agreed between stakeholders at the sub-
national level to respect huge differences between provinces. 
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Executive summary 
Delivering Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) services during humanitarian 
emergencies and immediate recovery phases is essential for saving lives and responding to 
basic needs, yet choices about how WASH services are delivered can undermine future 
development and peace. Longer-term interventions can also overlook how they equip 
communities, households and government to prepare and respond to future emergencies. 
This is increasingly evident in protracted or recurrent crises, in which overlapping and 
cyclical phases of emergency, relief, recovery and development interventions coexist. In 
these contexts, practitioners and academics alike have acknowledged the problem of 
reconciling the fundamentally different institutional cultures, assumptions, values, 
structures and ways of working that characterise the humanitarian and the development 
communities.  
 
In this report, we analyse humanitarian and development approaches in a specific sector, in 
a particular country: WASH interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). We 
consider how and why siloes have arisen. We argue that the problem is not so much about 
filling a ‘gap’ between humanitarian and development siloes, but about aligning the 
principles and practices of both communities in specific contexts so that the overall 
response can meet changing needs and constraints. We identify a number of ways through 
which improved complementarity might be achieved, differentiating between national and 
sub-national levels.  
 
DRC has been in crisis for decades, facing conflict, outbreaks of epidemics, natural 
disasters, and food security emergencies at recurrent intervals. In this context humanitarian 
and development interventions, including in WASH, have tended to occur simultaneously, 
albeit with some geographical separation. Eastern DRC has received a high share of 
humanitarian attention due to the various and repeated instances of conflict it has faced. 
Other parts of the country have received large amounts of development aid, such as the ex-
province of Katanga in which research was conducted for this case study.  
 
Like many other basic service sectors in DRC, WASH receives limited financial support 
from the state, with substantial finance coming from both development and humanitarian 
donors. Financial support from WASH development partners in DRC has focused on 
building, maintaining and repairing water and sanitation infrastructure, and engaging 
communities and local governments and authorities in WASH provision. The Healthy 
Villages and School (VEA) programme, run by UNICEF in partnership with the 
government, is the largest development WASH intervention in the country. Interventions 
from humanitarian actors in the WASH sector have focused primarily on providing life-
saving and emergency water and sanitation to people in conflict (IDPs and returnees) and 
during cholera and other epidemics. Recent funding, channelled through the pooled 
humanitarian mechanisms, has been has been increasingly directed to crisis prevention and 
community resilience projects. Several humanitarian interventions have also ‘stretched out’ 
to incorporate operational modalities and objectives that are more typical of development 
interventions, but this is far from the norm. 
 
If different funding channels and implementation approaches maintain the disconnect, there 
are numerous other underlying reasons. The geographical and political characteristics of 
  
DRC render collaboration between the provinces and with Kinshasa challenging: the capital 
city and DRC’s provinces are separated by large distances, with poor communication 
channels and transport links. This reduces the capacity and political motivation of the 
government to ensure that interventions are implemented effectively, and prevents national-
level teams from having effective oversight of provincial level interventions. It also limits 
the capacity of local and provincial offices and organisations to input into national planning.  
 
Coordination between WASH humanitarian and development actors was also found to be 
challenging due to persistent differences in recruitment processes and reporting mechanisms 
and the incentives these create. Humanitarian organisations are characterised by high turn-
over of staff which hampers their capacity to conduct longer-term programmes or inform 
their interventions with comprehensive socio-economic assessments and conflict analyses. 
Furthermore, accountability of humanitarian organisations to their country offices is based 
on reporting of short-term results (e.g. number of people reached by chlorine delivery) 
rather than outcomes and impacts. In contrast, development programmes generally have 
reporting which is more burdensome but focused on longer-term indicators of success.  
 
Despite these differences, in some areas humanitarian and development WASH actors have 
been able to work effectively together on common problems. In Katanga, for example, 
repeated cholera outbreaks have offered a window of opportunity for humanitarian and 
development WASH actors to collaborate towards a common goal, coordinating to tackle 
root causes of cholera (inadequate WASH services) as well as to meet emergency needs.  
 
Our analysis identified a number of ways in which improved complementarity between 
humanitarian and development WASH approaches might be achieved in DRC. These 
correspond to undertaking strategic, supporting reforms and innovations at the national level 
whilst making more operationally focused adjustments at the sub-national (provincial) level.  
 
At the national level, a first step is to take a more differentiated approach to WASH, 
recognising the huge scale and diversity of the country. Agency staff based in Kinshasa 
should support sub-national strategies and approaches to WASH which take account of 
distinct regional political economies. This would ensure that interventions respond to the 
real needs on the ground, and provide greater flexibility to take advantage of windows of 
opportunities and focus on problem-solving. Second, WASH donors should examine how 
they might provide more flexible financing, for example that matches the flexibility of 
humanitarian funding modalities with the longer-term perspective of more programmatic 
development finance. Third, greater investment is needed in locally led initiatives with a 
meaningful role for Congolese organisations, for whom the humanitarian and development 
siloes may appear to be artificial constructs of the aid community. Fourth, both 
humanitarian and development organisations should more systematically document their 
experience of WASH interventions to identify the particular conditions, contexts and issues 
for which their approaches work (or do not work).  
 
Our study also highlighted the need to improve complementarity of WASH approaches at 
the sub-national level through the identification of common principles. These are a set of 
pragmatic, mutually agreeable ways of working that can be agreed among agencies that 
support the delivery of WASH, whether they identify as ‘humanitarian’ or ‘development’. 
 
To be relevant and useful, the common principles should be deliberated and agreed between 
a range of stakeholders at the provincial level, representing development and humanitarian 
communities and wherever possible involving local government and civil society 
organisations. UNICEF can play a central convening and catalysing role given its presence 
in Kinshasa and DRC provincial capitals coupled with its understanding of both 
humanitarian and development communities, as well as its leadership role in the WASH 
Cluster. However, encouraging and empowering the government to take a leadership role 
within the sector, with both capability and legitimacy, must remain an ultimate long-term 
  
ambition. Our paper sets out a number of common principles which can be taken as 
examples or adopted where they are relevant to different provinces. 
 
  
  
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
This report is part of a broader study focused on understanding the nature and causes of the 
disconnect between development and humanitarian WASH interventions, and possible 
solutions. It presents findings from the DRC case study. ODI researchers have also 
produced a second case study on South Sudan, as well as a synthesis report and briefing 
note. The overall objective of the study is to examine ways to ensure better 
complementarity between humanitarian and development approaches in protracted conflict 
and crisis situations to improve WASH service delivery. The work was commissioned by 
the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Section in the United Nations Children Fund 
(UNICEF) together with Water Sanitation Program (WSP) of the World Bank, and 
undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). 
This research can be situated within the long-standing debate on the challenges of Linking 
Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) (Mosel and Levine, 2014). Supporting the 
delivery of services like WASH during humanitarian emergencies and immediate recovery 
phases has been seen as essential in terms of addressing life-saving needs, but modes of 
WASH service delivery can undermine or support future development and peace. In 
WASH, as in the broader LRRD debate, siloes continue to exist between humanitarian and 
development programming (Wild and Mason 2012).  
The supply of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) offers a useful entry point to the 
broader LRRD debate, as it is both a key pillar of humanitarian interventions in 
emergencies and crises, and of longer-term programmes focusing on the participation of 
local communities and governments towards resilience-building and sustainable socio-
economic development.  
Practitioners and academics alike have acknowledged the problem of reconciling the 
fundamentally different institutional cultures, assumptions, values, structures and ways of 
working that characterise the humanitarian and development ‘communities’. This debate 
has resulted in some recent changes in the delivery of relief, for example through cash 
transfers and a stronger focus on exit strategies and sustainability. It has also resulted in the 
addition of the concept of ‘connectedness’ to the list of criteria for Evaluating Humanitarian 
Assistance in Complex Emergencies (OECD-DAC 1999: 22).1 However, it has had a far 
weaker impact on the way in which development assistance is being provided and targeted 
(Mosel and Levine 2014).  
In the face of protracted crises (see Box 1) it becomes paramount to identify ways in which 
international aid can address emergency needs of the most vulnerable while supporting, or 
at least not undermining, the long-term development prospects of a country and its people. 
The upcoming World Humanitarian Summit and processes to operationalise the Sustainable 
Development Goals offer unique opportunities to reflect on these questions. While the 
situation in the DRC is in many ways unique, certain findings may be relevant to other 
protracted crises, for example Haiti, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan-Pakistan. 
 
 
 
1 Connectedness is defined as ‘the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in 
a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account’ (Beck 2006: 2).  
  
Box 1: What is a protracted crisis? 
According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), protracted crises 
are characterised by their longevity, the presence of conflict, weak governance, 
unsustainable livelihoods and the breakdown of local institutions (FAO 2010; 
2012). Therefore, engagement in these contexts will be impacted by: 
 The presence of extreme and widespread needs (where the ‘normal’ 
continuously passes emergency thresholds) 
 Unpredictable and rapidly changing needs, with different segments of 
the population requiring very different support at any given time 
 High insecurity, as state structures are weak and contested or have 
broken down completely, leading to absent or weak rule of law 
 Deep mistrust within societies and between societies and what is left 
of state structures, with a high a degree of politicisation of resources, 
including aid. 
 
Source: Mosel and Levine (2014)  
 
In this paper we argue that the problem is not so much about filling a ‘gap’ between 
humanitarian and development interventions; rather, the central challenge is to align the 
principles and practices of both ‘communities’ in specific contexts so that the overall 
response can adequately meet changing needs and constraints. It is not about ‘bridging the 
gap’ by creating a new category or funding mechanism that sits in the middle of 
humanitarian and development aid, but ensuring better complementarity and collaboration 
within the international aid/assistance architecture (be it humanitarian or development). 
This can be achieved by fostering strategic collaboration between all WASH actors in a 
given context, so that international aid is used to prevent and respond to crises, while 
contributing to development goals in the long term, to the benefit of the people both 
communities seek to serve.  
 
1.2 Methodology 
The scope of this study is delineated in two main ways: it focuses on WASH, and on a 
particular country case. The DRC case study was based on a preliminary desk review of key 
literature on WASH service delivery in conflict and protracted crises and disaster situations 
as well as qualitative interviews with key global and in-country stakeholders. On the basis 
of consultations with the UNICEF DRC Country Office, it was decided that the in-country 
interviews would be carried out at the national level in Kinshasa and in the ‘ex-Province’ of 
Katanga.2 Whilst Katanga is one of the richest areas of DRC due mainly to its exploitable 
reserve of mineral resources, its socio-economic indicators are poor and it faces multiple 
challenges, including regular outbreaks of cholera and other epidemics (e.g. measles), high 
rates of acute malnutrition, and increasing numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) 
due to the violence and insecurity associated with the Mayi-Mayi militia groups. The 
purpose of the two field visits was to understand how different configurations of 
humanitarian and development actors interact and implement WASH interventions at the 
national and provincial levels, with the provincial research focusing more on the operational 
activity. 
Primary data collection was undertaken by two ODI researchers each accompanied by a 
Congolese national consultant with extensive knowledge and experience of the WASH and 
 
 
2 At the time of the field work, Katanga was a Province of DRC. As of March 2016, the administrative 
‘decoupage’ process has resulted in the breaking up of Katanga. 
  
health sectors in DRC. Fieldwork visits were undertaken in Kinshasa from 31 August to 4 
September 2015 and in Lumbubashi from 13-19 September. The fieldwork used semi-
structured discussions with key stakeholders in each of the fieldwork locations. In total, 30 
individual interviews were conducted with a broad range of stakeholders including UNICEF 
country office and field staff, donors, UN agencies, international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs), national non-governmental organisations (NNGOs), government 
counterparts, and beneficiary communities (see Appendix 1 for a complete list of 
interviewees). Interviews were conducted in French and records where translated into 
English. 
Box 2 sets out the overarching research questions that guided this study. Further 
methodological details and an expanded set of questions are available in Appendix 2 and 3, 
respectively. Due to the relative lack of research on humanitarian and development siloes in 
the WASH sector specifically, an iterative, inductive approach was used, rather than a rigid, 
predefined analytical framework. While the overarching research questions were agreed in 
advance with UNICEF and WSP, the research design and particularly the expanded set of 
questions (Appendix 2 and 3) were adjusted through the course of desk research and field 
work. This allowed us to incorporate insights from discussions with global and regional 
sector experts and humanitarian and development professionals. We selected this approach 
to avoid constraining our analysis to pre-set categories, and instead incorporated issues as 
they emerged, such as institutional cultures, assumptions and values; operational structures 
and ways of working; interaction and effective collaboration; and institutional arrangements 
and incentives. 
 
Box 2: Key research questions 
 How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, 
programmes and approaches interact currently, and what is the story 
of their interaction up to now?  
 Do individuals, teams and organisations undertaking humanitarian 
and development WASH collaborate effectively? If not, why? 
 How are decisions about programming and policy made, within and 
between humanitarian and development WASH communities, and do 
decisions lead to effective action on the ground? If not, what are the 
underlying reasons?  
 What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and 
complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at 
all levels, including around the institutional arrangements and 
operating structures and incentives?  
 
Source: Authors 
 
The rest of this report considers, in turn: the nature of the protracted crisis in DRC (Section 
2); the recent history and institutional architecture of the WASH sector in the country, 
including the core features of the ‘Sanitary Village, Sanitary Schools’ programme (Section 
3); the nature of the interaction between the two sectors (Section 4); what efforts have been 
made to enhance complementarity to date (Section 5); and finally, our recommendations for 
increasing complementarity between humanitarian and development WASH, and with other 
actors including the government and civil society in DRC (Section 6). 
  
  
2. Characterising the 
crisis in DRC 
The Democratic Republic of Congo is a country which can be said to be experiencing 
protracted and recurrent humanitarian crises. The multiple crises of violence and conflict, 
epidemics, malnutrition and natural disasters have cost many Congolese people their lives 
and deprived thousands more of security, livelihoods and basic goods and services. DRC’s 
recurring crises have for many years been among the most serious in the world. In 2013, 
DRC was the fifth largest recipient of international humanitarian assistance (GHA 2015), 
receiving $7.41 billion,3 and it has figured among the top ten recipients for over 10 years. 
The various crises in DRC are estimated to affect 20% of the population – an estimated 15 
million people (GHA 2015).  
 
DRC is an immense and incredibly complex country. Its national boundaries contain a 
diverse range of ethnic, socio-cultural and linguistic populations spread over a geographical 
area the size of Western Europe. It was administered through ten provinces and its capital 
city until July 2015, when the long-awaited decentralisation policy divided the country into 
25 provinces plus Kinshasa.4 The economic characteristics and natural resource 
endowments of the country’s provinces differ dramatically: the provinces have remained 
separated owing to limited internal transportation and communication networks. As a result, 
DRC’s provinces have been historically more oriented outwards towards neighbouring 
countries with better infrastructure or towards international markets than towards Kinshasa. 
Ethnic conflicts over land and natural resources are significant in several parts of the 
country, and are echoed in provincial and national politics. The capacity of the Congolese 
state to deliver public goods and services is weak to the point of being non-existent, with 
non-state actors playing a critical role in the provision of basic services such as education 
and health.  
The DRC has been in a situation of high fragility following decades of conflict and crisis. 
Since independence in 1960, the country has been plagued by a series of conflicts, from the 
1965 coup that brought Mobutu Sese Seko to power to the First and Second Congo Wars 
from 1996 to 2003. Whilst the election of Kabila in 2006 marked the official end of the 
post-war transition which began in 2003, the reality of the DRC is not simply a transition 
‘out’ of war. Since 2006 the country has experienced extended national and regional armed 
conflicts and burgeoning conflict in areas once thought stable. In particular, waves of 
violence in Eastern DRC undertaken by a diverse range of armed actors, including the 
undisciplined Congolese army, have wreaked havoc on the local population and forced 
hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes. The drivers of this violence and how 
they interact across local, national and regional levels are complex: they include tensions 
over land, ethnic and national identity, the control of natural resources, the fragility of state 
power and regional political and security dynamics (Kooy and Bailey 2012). There is a risk 
that international actors and policy-makers shape their interventions around the over-
simplified narratives of conflict minerals, sexual violence and state-building (Autesserre 
2011; 2012 in: Kooy and Bailey 2012). This makes for a complex environment for aid 
 
 
3 OCHA Financial Tracking Service, accessed 21 October 2015. 
4 The subdivision of the country from 11 to 26 provinces was enshrined in the 2006 constitution, but it took years 
before it was implemented on 16 July 2015. Nevertheless, gubernatorial elections have yet to take place – and are 
unlikely to happen before the 2017 national elections; many of the new provinces also do not have official 
structures in place.  
  
agencies and donors seeking to promote development, peace-building, state-building and 
address humanitarian needs – objectives that are not always perfectly compatible with one 
another. 
The seemingly endless cycle of violence and insecurity has been perpetuated by a 
generalised context of widespread and increasing poverty, chronic instability, and natural 
disasters in the almost complete absence of a functioning government. The state itself is a 
major obstacle to development and is characterised by a predatory, corrupt, and clientelistic 
behaviour (International Alert 2015; Trefon 2011). Malnutrition, cholera epidemics and 
chronic flooding have generated crises in more stable areas of the country. Whilst four main 
crisis narratives can be distinguished (see Box 3) the interlinkages and reciprocity between 
the different factors increases both the complexity and severity of the challenge facing 
DRC. 
 
Box 3: Four major crisis narratives in DRC 
The multiple crises facing DRC include: 
 Armed conflicts: About 6.5 million people face vulnerabilities related 
to violence and displacement – they require protection, food security, 
essential household items and access to basic services. Regions 
particularly affected primarily the Provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu 
and Orientale  
 Nutritional crises: As of September 2015, the UN Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that 4.8 
million people were in need of food aid and agriculture support. Acute 
nutritional crises in the DRC affect different provinces, and in 
particular Kasaï Occidental, Kasaï Oriental and Bandundu are 
particularly affected. They are worsened but not exclusively caused 
by IDP movements and conflict. They particularly affect children 
under the age of five; for them, the rate of global acute malnutrition 
has been estimated to be between 11% and 15%(HRP 2015) 
 Health epidemics, in particular cholera, measles and viral 
haemorrhagic fever (including Ebola), are also recurrent in different 
parts of the country. For example, South Kivu is particularly 
vulnerable to cholera epidemics. In Katanga, the ongoing measles 
epidemics has affected more than 30,000 people since January 2015.  
 Tensions over land and control of resources: These are often related 
to the control of customary power, and can degenerate into inter-
ethnic conflicts and political rivalries such as in Katanga, Kasai 
Occidental, Kasai Orientale, North Kivu and Bandudu. 
 
The extent to which these crises are present in particular provinces varies as 
does the way provinces experience them. Katanga, the focus for our sub-
national case study, has experienced nearly all these types of crises to varying 
degrees in recent years: several cholera and measles epidemics have broken 
out; food security is problematic in some parts; and there has been an ongoing 
localised conflict with the Mayi-Mayi in Katanga.  
Source: Authors 
  
3. WASH needs and 
interventions in DRC 
 
 
3.1 WASH access and provision 
Like other basic services in DRC, the WASH sector is characterised by low levels of state 
provision, particularly at village level. However, the institutional framework of WASH is 
more fragmented than other sectors like health and education that have a greater number of 
traditional and non-state providers present, such as faith-based organisations (World Bank 
2011). Whilst the country has an abundance of water, its varied topography means that the 
technical methods and costs of providing safe drinking water differ considerably between 
regions (for example between piped water, motorised systems, and gravity flow systems).  
 
The sector suffered major setbacks during the country’s long political crisis in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, and recovery has been slow (World Bank 2011). Despite the fact that DRC 
is not a country in which water resources are scarce, nearly half of the Congolese population 
still rely on the supply of water from unprotected sources (JMP 2015). The limited financial 
resources allocated to the sector mean that development of new facilities is slow and 
existing ones are seldom maintained. Virtually all sanitation facilities in rural areas are 
constructed and maintained by private parties such as non-governmental organisations and 
religious missions (Kooy and Bailey 2012).5 
 
According to recent data from the Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) of UNICEF and the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), only 1% of the rural population in DRC has piped 
water in their homes, and only 30% of households have access to other improved water 
sources. The percentage of people using unimproved water sources increased from 39% in 
1990 to 52% in 2015, with a further 17% currently reliant on surface water sources. Even in 
cities, 16% of the population still use unimproved sources and 3% are reliant on surface 
water. With respect to sanitation, only 29% of the population has access to improved 
facilities (in both urban and rural areas), while 10% of the population still practises open 
defecation (3% in cities and 16% in rural areas) (JMP 2015). In recognition of these trends, 
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets set for the DRC were lowered in 2006, 
and set to 49% coverage for safe drinking water and 45% for sanitation (World Bank 2006).  
 
The lack of access to protected water sources and poor levels of sanitation pose a serious 
public health threat to the DRC. They are contributing factors to the widespread presence of 
cholera in the country: the WHO estimates that in 2013 there were 26,942 cases of cholera; 
this number was slightly reduced in 2014 when 15,591 cases were registered in the period 
January-September (UNICEF 2014). Diarrhoeal diseases also remain a leading cause of 
death, killing 109,800 people in 2012 (data as of January 2015).6  
 
 
 
 
5 Information from personal communication with UNICEF DRC, November 2015. 
6 See: www.who.int/gho/countries/cod.pdf?ua=1  
  
3.2 Institutional framework for WASH 
The WASH sector in the DRC operates in the context of an extremely weak institutional 
framework. The lack of regulation and policies or clarity over the mandates and 
responsibilities of the different actors impedes substantial investments and commitments to 
WASH infrastructure and service delivery in the country. The lack of access to improved 
water sources and sanitation, in turn, maintains high rates of cholera, typhoid and other 
water-borne diseases; it also creates and/or reinforces nutritional crises, and may risk 
exacerbating existing conflicts, for instance between neighbouring communities and groups. 
A comprehensive Water Law has been in development since 2007. Despite achieving a 
broad stakeholder consensus, it was only adopted by the National Assembly on 15 
November 2015 due to serious underlying coordination issues between the plethora of 
ministries involved in water resource management, who struggled to agree on who should 
be given the leadership of the sector under the new arrangement.7 The multiplicity of actors 
present in the sector has contributed to this, as has the incoherence of the policy framework. 
Several central ministries and agencies have held overlapping responsibilities in the water 
sector, but none with a clear mandate or authority to coordinate sector policies. There is 
currently no nationwide policy or planning for rural water supply or sanitation, and until 
now there has been no single lead ministerial responsibility for rural sanitation and hygiene, 
with roles split between ministries (Health and Environment). Box 4 below gives a brief 
overview of responsibilities for urban and rural water supply and sanitation. Information on 
sector roles and responsibilities is limited and unclear – indicative of the wider institutional 
coordination challenges. Most of the information in Box 4 comes from the 2011 DRC 
Country Status Overview for the African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW), 
corroborated with interviews where possible. 
 
Administratively the DRC is in the midst of a decentralisation process which was stipulated 
in the DRC Constitution (2006) and subsequent Laws on Decentralisation (2008). In theory, 
decentralisation will involve a devolution of substantial public resources and decision-
making authority to elected bodies at the sub-provincial levels of cities, communes, sectors, 
and chiefdoms; grouped together, these are the Decentralised Territorial Entities (Entités 
Territoriales Decentralisées). While donor-influenced dialogue and support appear to have 
kept questions of decentralisation on the DRC agenda, however, political support for it has 
been tokenistic and progress has been slow. WASH sector decentralisation will theoretically 
mean that national polices and regulations will be defined at the central level, but that 
primary responsibility for WASH services will move to provincial and municipal 
authorities. This will require a coherent legal and policy framework which clearly defines 
roles and responsibilities at both the provincial and central level – a framework that is 
currently lacking.  
Coordination for the sector has been the responsibility of the National Water and Sanitation 
Committee (Comité Nationale des Agences de l’Eau et Assainissement – CNAEA) since the 
1980s when it was set up under the control of the national water agency, REGIDESO. 
However, in 2007, given the focus of REGIDESO on urban water supply, the CNAEA was 
recreated under the Ministry of Planning. The strategy of placing the water sector 
coordination under the Minister of Planning was justified on the basis of ensuring a better 
distribution of resources between the urban and rural areas, thus enabling the rural sector to 
receive more resources.8 At present, the activities of the CNAEA focus on clarifying the 
institutional and legal framework for the management of water resources, including water 
delivery in urban and rural areas. It also oversees the implementation of the decentralisation 
process in the water sector (see further discussion of CNAEA in section 3.4). 
 
 
 
7 In DRC a wide range of ministries’ have responsibility for water resource management. Amongst these are: 
Ministry of Planning; Ministry of Health, Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development; Ministry of 
agriculture fishing and livestock; Ministry of Energy and Hydraulic Resources, and the Ministry of National 
Economy.  
8 Interviews with respondents in Kinshasa 31 August to 4 September 2015. 
  
Historically in DRC, with its size and highly centralised management system, the needs of 
the vast population at the localised level have not been a major concern of the government 
in Kinshasa. The government plays only a peripheral role in the WASH sub-sectors and has 
a tendency to transfer their responsibilities to development partners and humanitarian 
agencies. 
 
Box 4: Key actors in the DRC urban and rural WASH sector 
In the water sector, the Ministry of Planning is responsible for the elaboration 
and monitoring of the country’s Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategies9 and 
is involved in the WASH sector through the CNAEA. Whilst the CNAEA has a 
broad mandate for water policy development, programming and monitoring, as 
well as coordination at the inter-ministerial level and with development partners, 
it has remained powerless in the face of conflicting interests between ministries.  
Urban water supply: The national water utility REGIDESO remains the central 
actor of urban water supply with technical capacity on water supply matters. 
With investments skewed towards Kinshasa, it is active in other cities at a 
reduced scale, and 20% of its networks, serving mostly secondary towns, are 
inactive. It operates under the administrative and financial oversight of the 
Ministry of State Portfolio and under the technical oversight of the Ministry of 
Energy, which is responsible for urban water supply policies. Under the ongoing 
reform of public enterprises, which is supported by the World Bank, REGIDESO 
is being transformed into a public enterprise with commercial statutes.  
Rural water supply: The National Service for Rural Water Supply (Service 
National de l’Hydraulique Rurale – SNHR) is nominally responsible for rural 
water supply. Whilst it currently sits within the Ministry of Rural Development, it 
will become the responsibility of the provinces under the proposed 
decentralisation reforms. The Ministries of Public Health and Education are also 
engaged in rural water supply through the Healthy Schools and Villages 
(Villages et écoles assainies – VEA) programme, which integrates sanitation 
and hygiene education. Also important is a multi-donor programme, executed 
by Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC), which is supporting community-based 
autonomous water supply systems.  
Rural and urban sanitation: There is no national sector policy beyond basic 
target setting in the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (Document de 
Stratégies et de Croissance pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté – DSCRP). The 
two central institutional structures with a nominal mandate for sanitation 
interventions are the National Sanitation Programme/National Directorate of 
Hygiene within the Ministry of Environment, and the Office of Roadways and 
Drainage within the Ministry of Infrastructure, Public Work and Reconstruction. 
However, they are described as ‘dysfunctional and severely resource 
constrained’ (World Bank 2011: 18). In rural areas, the primary interventions 
are the sanitation components of the VEA programmes supported by the 
Ministry of Public Health and UNICEF. 
Source: World Bank 2011 
 
3.3 Development WASH interventions 
There are a number of bilateral and multilateral partners involved in development-oriented 
WASH interventions in DRC, with the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA), and BTC particularly prominent. From 
2007/08, the annual pace of public expenditure for the water and sanitation sector amounted 
to about $65 million per year, of which $62 million (95%) was provided as external aid. In 
 
 
9 DSCRP I (2007-09), and the DSCRP II (2010-13). 
  
most cases there is, at least on paper, an attempt to include the Congolese government as a 
partner in development-oriented WASH projects. In practice, however, implementation is 
exclusively rolled out by NGOs or subcontractors.  
One of the largest development WASH interventions in DRC is the national programme 
Healthy Schools and Villages (Villages et écoles assainies – VEA) which has been jointly 
implemented by the health and education ministries with the support of UNICEF since 2006 
(see Box 5). Although it is always described as a ‘national programme’, in reality UNICEF 
provides the funding ($250 million) and technical expertise and without UNICEF’s 
continued intervention the programme would not function. The programme accompanies 
villages and schools through a number of steps in the process and helps them attain the 
required norms. The steps combine hygiene education/awareness with diagnosis, 
community action planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.10 Villages and 
schools which successfully achieve a number of WASH-related indicators are certified as 
healthy. 
 
Box 5: Healthy Schools and Villages  
In 2006 the government initiated the VEA Programme in 11 provinces operating 
through the local health zones. VEA built on a government programme which 
had been started in the 1990s in coordination with the USAID-funded Primary 
Health Care Project in rural areas, SANRU, which identified a series of 
standards that a village had to comply with in order to be certified as sanitary. 
The overall objective of the VEA Programme is to ‘ensure the survival and 
development of children by increasing the rate of access to clean water, 
improved sanitation and improved and hygiene education’. This involves (1) 
improving access to clean water, adequate sanitation, good hygiene practices 
and a healthy environment in the target communities and in schools, (2) 
capacity building for government stakeholders in charge of education, health, 
water and sanitation, and (3) improving the national and local policy and 
governance of the sector to better control the implementation of the 
programme.  
VEA is led by the ministries responsible for health and education with financial 
support from UNICEF, DFID, USAID and the Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency. UNICEF-DRC is the main partner for implementation 
working with NGOs and local committees. The government and UNICEF-DRC 
mutually undertake to assist the population to progressively achieve and 
maintain their right to clean water and a healthy environment. The programme 
works with local communities, traditional leaders, local NGOs, and health and 
education personnel through the local health zones. The active participation of 
communities and families is integral to the programme.  
Source: EAA (2012) 
 
The VEA programme is implemented in 11 provinces and around 9,000 villages. It is 
managed and monitored through the Provincial Health Directorates (Directions 
Provinciales de Santé – DPSs), who pay salaries, equipment and administrative costs. 
Within the DPS, the key actor for VEA implementation is the local health zone’s central 
office, each of which has two staff members dedicated to the programme. UNICEF provides 
training to public servants involved in the programme across the country, with offices in 
each province; it also supports NGOs to implement WASH activities in villages alongside 
government agencies.  
 
 
10 There are eight steps and seven norms for villages (seven steps and six norms for schools) which relate to water 
access, latrine usage, hand-washing practice, cleanliness etc. The complete list of steps and norms is available at: 
http://swiftconsortium.org/what/sanitation.  
  
 
The results of the programme have, however, been mixed and there are challenging 
questions around how sustainable they are. In Phase 1, a sustainability study showed that a 
large number of villages have reverted back to ‘unhealthy’ practices (i.e. people no longer 
using latrines) after they have received their certification (only 5% kept their certification). 
This was echoed by our interviews both in Kinshasa and in Katanga. In response, in phase 
2, UNICEF added a component for follow-up of implementation, to ensure that the villages 
continued to practice the promoted behaviours after they had obtained the VEA 
certification. 
Interviewees attributed these shortcomings to a combination of poor technical interventions, 
lack of capacities to ensure the maintenance of the infrastructure, and lack of ownership 
from the community. Several interviewees indicated that while communities are 
incentivised to engage in the process to secure infrastructure such as the building of water 
pumps, once this is in place there are fewer incentives to maintain facilities.11 Other 
challenges for the VEA approach were highlighted as follows:12 
 Religious and cultural barriers to changing the attitudes and behaviours 
of communities. The role of the village chief was viewed as fundamental 
– it was noted that where village chiefs were educated and aware of the 
importance of hygiene practices themselves, there was a higher chance 
the process would take root in communities.  
 Understaffed health zones, with insufficient technicians and/or logistical 
means to ensure the thorough monitoring of the implementation of VEA 
activities. In some cases, support is provided by NGO staff, but this 
happens on a project basis; in any case, when the project is over, NGO 
staff leave. An approach highlighted to resolve this issue has been to 
rely more on already existing local organisations, e.g. women’s groups.  
 The geographical spread of the VEA interventions. Until recently, 
geographical dispersion meant that the achievements in one health zone 
in terms of reducing the number of cholera cases were nullified by the 
lack of intervention in neighbouring villages (because people move and 
carry the disease with them). This is being resolved by coordinating the 
geographical focus of the interventions so as to reach a ‘critical mass’ of 
targeted communities for more sustainable results (instead of deciding 
the interventions only on the basis of requests from the health zones). 
In order to address these challenges, the programme approach has evolved since its origin in 
2006. There is greater community involvement to minimise the top-down supply-driven 
distribution of materials, and subsidies for household sanitation have been phased out. 
UNICEF recently introduced a new phase of the VEA programme post-certification. In this 
phase, the Ministry of Health’s Hygiene Division – in charge of implementing the VEA 
programme – establishes facilitation teams that accompany communities in the process. 
Facilitation teams work with the communities to encourage them to resume ‘healthy 
practices’ such as hand-washing, ending open defecation, and so on.13  
 
Other development partners have also been involved in various capacities with VEA. Since 
2012, the Dutch development organisation SNV has been supporting the capacity building 
of VEA partners and local authorities through cooperation and partnership agreements with 
UNICEF. The nature of their interventions has changed over time in response to learning 
from their experience. There have been moves to better understand local structures to 
overcome the problem of local appropriation of the programme and to explain the variety of 
outcomes recorded across different committees.14 
 
 
11 Interview with respondent from international NGO, held in Lubumbashi on 15 September 2015. 
12 From interviews with representatives of: UNICEF, MMG, Health Division, international and national NGOs, 
held in Lubumbashi in September 2015. 
13 Information from interview with respondent from Division of Hygiene of Ministry of Health, held in 
Lubumbashi on 14 September 2015. 
14 Information from interview with respondent from SNV, held in Kinshasa on 1 September 2015. 
  
Also important in the rural water sector is BTC. BTC implement bilateral and multilateral 
programmes focusing on the rural WASH sub-sector. They currently implement a multi-
donor programme supporting rural and peri-urban community-based autonomous water 
supply systems in five provinces (Kasai-Oriental, Maniema, Bas-Congo, and Sud-Kivu). 
The programme is responsible for building new infrastructure in areas where REGIDESO is 
not present and for putting in place autonomous management systems in collaboration with 
the government. The programme embeds BTC technical staff in national public 
administration offices and works with local Congolese organisations. It is designed to be a 
flexible programme which adapts to circumstances on the ground.  
 
The DRC WASH Consortium is another key player in development-oriented WASH. It 
comprises five INGOs (Action Contre la Faim, Agence d’Aide à la Coopération Technique 
et au Développement, Catholic Relief Services, Concern Worldwide and Solidarités 
International) and provides support to reach the steps of VEA. It is in principle a 
development programme which started in 2013 and will last until 2017, but the teams on the 
ground often take a humanitarian approach. The consortium tries to adapt and promote 
innovation in the WASH sector. It works in 500 villages across 15 health zones in stable 
areas such as Katanga. The objective of the WASH Consortium is to align with the national 
strategy (certification of VEA) and promote innovation. 
 
According to an assessment of the water and sanitation sector in the DRC undertaken by 
AMCOW in 2011, large aid flows have been mobilised for the rehabilitation of water 
supply installations and services, but the effective utilisation of investments has been 
slowed down by institutional and administrative dysfunction, weak capacity as well as the 
general lack of supporting infrastructure, logistics, and economic services (banking, 
transport suppliers, and so on) (World Bank 2011). The actual utilisation of committed 
funds is generally less than 50% in public projects (World Bank 2011). For example, major 
ventures such as the 2008-2015 World Bank’s Urban Water Supply Project (Projet 
d'Alimentation en Eau potable en Milieu Urban), supported by an International 
Development Association grant of $190 million, have been delayed by the low utilisation of 
committed funds, due in turn to the weak implementation capacity of government 
counterparts (World Bank 2011). Moreover, given the absence of the national sector WASH 
policy, the majority of development aid is linked to the basic targets for WASH service 
delivery set in the country’s growth and poverty reduction strategy.  
 
3.4 Humanitarian WASH interventions 
Humanitarian interventions in the WASH sector in DRC have largely consisted of life-
saving and emergency WASH support to IDPs and conflict-affected people, as well as 
investments in measures to enhance the sector’s preparedness and response. However, due 
to the protracted nature of the crisis, WASH humanitarian actors have also engaged in more 
preventive strategies, for instance awareness-raising hygiene campaigns in cholera-endemic 
areas. These interventions have been concentrated in specific geographical areas, such as 
eastern DRC. Some interviewees noted that the focus of humanitarian support has been not 
just about needs but about where it is logistically feasible to intervene due to availability of 
transport, accommodation and security. One interviewee argued that this has left gaps in 
areas suffering from emergencies that are not receiving humanitarian support.  
 
Questions were raised, moreover, as to how humanitarian needs are assessed. Several 
interviewees indicated that official IDP figures are unreliable and claimed that little is 
known about these people and what their diverse needs actually are. One interviewee said 
that she felt that, after 20 years’ presence, the interventions of her own organisation have 
become routine with colleagues assuming they already know what the problems and 
answers are.15 UNICEF interviewees also recognised that humanitarian objectives do not 
necessarily coincide with those of the populations.  
 
 
 
15 Information from interview with a donor agency respondent, held in Kinshasa on 31 August 2015. 
  
The 2015 WASH Cluster strategy focused on the priorities of violent conflicts, nutritional 
crises, epidemics and natural catastrophes, requesting a total budget of $79.2 million to 
target 7.5 million people. A large majority of this budget (80%) was directed to the 
provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu, Eastern and Katanga. In 2014 the response to the 
cholera epidemic in Katanga amounted to $12.4 million, which was also used to fund 
preparedness and community response activities (UNICEF 2015).  
Humanitarian response in DRC is financed through a number of funding vehicles. One of 
the most important is the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) a multi-donor pooled fund 
mechanism set up in 2006 at the initiative of humanitarian donors to provide flexible and 
predictable funding to support the country’s Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).16 In 2014 
the CHF was supported by seven bilateral donors: the UK, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, 
Ireland, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 56.4% of funding goes to the eastern provinces, 
31.6% to national and multi-province projects, and 9.5% to western provinces. This 
geographic distribution reflects the funding needs identified in the HRP. With respect to the 
WASH sector, the CHF has a strategic objective of improving access to clean water and 
delivering sanitation services as a means of reducing waterborne diseases such as cholera.17 
According to the 2014 CHF Annual Report, the WASH sector received $8 million in 2014, 
or 13.2% of total CHF allocations. This supported 20 projects which were delivered by 
international NGOs (14), NNGOs (4) and UN agencies (1). In 2014 the WASH sector 
received the largest number of allocations. By July 2015, CHF funding for WASH 
amounted to $3.7 million, 6.3% of the total (CHF 2014).18 Annual totals to the CHF suggest 
a general trend of diminishing humanitarian contributions.  
 
DRC has also been receiving funds from the Central Emergency Respond Fund (CERF) 
since 2006; in 2015, the DRC was allocated $14.8 million through this funding mechanism, 
which represents 5.02% of the total CERF allocations (in 2012, the DRC received $31.4 
million, equivalent to 6.43% of total allocations).19 Of the CERF budget, only $9 million 
was actually disbursed for projects aimed at improving protection response and access to 
education in conflict in North Kivu and Katanga. The 2014 CHF annual report noted there 
was good complementarity between the CHF and the CERF, notably for the Ebola crisis 
and the refugee crisis in the Central African Republic. CERF also sought to support 
emergency interventions by the UN agencies and all partners including NNGOs (CHF 
2014).  
 
Originally created as the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) in 2004 by UNICEF, OCHA, 
INGO Partners and DFID, and merged in 2009 with another UNICEF project (Programme 
for Extended Assistance to Returnees, PEAR), the Rapid Response to Population 
Movements (RRMP) mechanism was designed to better respond to acute emergency needs 
in the DRC, and especially to those of refugees and recently returned IDPs. Funded by 
multiple donors, it delivers assistance in specific sectors, such as non-food items, WASH, 
education and health. Interventions are usually limited to three months as they are supposed 
to start ‘when other actors lack the capacity to meet urgent humanitarian needs’ (Baker et al. 
2013). Some examples of interventions in the WASH sector are cholera response and 
prevention, construction of emergency latrines and water points, delivery of water and 
sanitation kits to IDPs. 
In 2011, UNICEF also established the Alternative Responses for Communities in Crisis 
(ARCC), funded by DFID. This multi-purpose unconditional cash approach was designed 
to respond in a more appropriate way to the heterogeneity of the needs of medium- to long-
 
 
16 It should be noted that the DRC benefited from the funding of the Emergency Response Fund, which was 
operational since 2004, but formally closed in December 2013 and replaced by the ‘reserve’ of the CHF. 
Information from: www.unocha.org/democratic-republic-congo/about-ocha-drc/common-humanitarian-fund 
17 Besides food, health and water and sanitation, some of this budget was allocated to fund projects in the health 
and NFI sector ($3 million), protection ($3.9 million), and education ($2.4 million). See: 
https://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_RPool2B_C239_Y2015___1509211511.pdf  
18 CHF is allocated to food security ($8.4 million); health ($6.07 million); coordination (more than $7 million 
going to UNDP, OCHA and WFP), and multi-sectorial projects ($4.8 million). 
19 See CERF’s website at: www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/where-we-work/cod-2015  
  
term returnees and internally displaced people and their host families. UNICEF and partners 
recently finished the second cycle of the two-year (2013-2015) ARCC programme, which 
tested the cash approaches in different sectors: humanitarian/transition; nutrition; education; 
and protection/gender-based violence.20 
 
Table 1 shows a reduction of the percentage of WASH funding requirements covered by 
humanitarian donors since 2009. Especially since 2014, when attention (and funds) had to 
turn towards conflict situations in Syria and Yemen, the funding for WASH has dropped by 
almost 50%. In both 2014 and 2015, most of the donors’ money was allocated to food 
security, nutrition and protection in 2014, and food security and logistics in 2015. The risk, 
admitted even by the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator during her visit to the 
country in September 2015, is that DRC ‘falls off the humanitarian radar’.21 
Table 1:  Amount of Humanitarian Response Plan funding per 
year, 2006-2014 (in US $). 
Year REQUIREM
ENTS 
(revised) 
Consolidat
ed Appeal 
Process 
(CAP) 
funding 
(not 
considerin
g carry-
over) 
% 
COVER
ED 
WASH 
REQUIREMEN
TS (revised) 
CAP 
WASH 
FUNDING 
(not 
consideri
ng carry-
over) 
%WASH 
COVER
ED 
2009 946m 514m  68.1% 117m 30m 26.4% 
2010 827.6m  445.1m 63% 115.7m 26.5m 22.9% 
2011 735.7m 392.4m 66.2% 95.6m 22.1m 23.1% 
2012 718.5m 548m 73.7% 79.1m 23.7m 30% 
2013 892.6m 497m 70.5% 89.3m  28.1m 31.4% 
2014 832m 386m 47.2% 70.6m 13.5m 19.2% 
2015 692m 258.3m 44.6% 79.2m 13.5m 17.1% 
Source : OCHA FTS DRC page22 
 
3.5 WASH coordination mechanisms 
In theory, the CNAEA is supposed to coordinate the WASH sector at the national level, 
including by ensuring inter-ministerial coordination and complementarity between 
development and humanitarian programmes. The provincial committees (Provincial Water 
and Sanitation Committees – CPAEAs) have equivalent responsibility in their provinces. 
However, several interviews revealed that the CNAEA views its role almost exclusively in 
terms of supporting the development of sustainable strategies for providing safe drinking 
water, despite occasionally cross-overs when there are recurring epidemics (i.e. cholera), 
 
 
20 Also see: Information from blog post by Gabriele Erba, Monitoring Specialist, ARCC UNICEF RDC, available 
at: www.cashlearning.org/news-and-events/news-and-events/post/223-unicefas-alternative-responses-for-
communities-in-crisis-arcc-programme-a-the-largest-humanitarian-multi-purpose-unconditional-cash-transfer-
program-in-the-drc.  
21 See www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51807#.Vfsgzd-qqko  
22 Starting from 2009, the first year of the cluster system. 
  
the underlying causes of which are related to the lack of safe water supplies.23 In practice 
this means that they focus on development-oriented projects, which tend to have an urban 
water bias. The separation of the CNAEA from the REGIDESO created serious conflicts 
within the sector, leading REGIDESO to refuse providing technical support to the CNAEA. 
There are claims that CNAEA is becoming increasingly politicised.24  
 
Information provided by different respondents pointed to the incapacity of the CNAEA to 
coordinate the water sector. A pilot steering committee composed of the various ministries 
with responsibility for water exists within CNAEA, but it does not seem to be functioning. 
At the provincial level, the CPAEAs have even less capacity; they often consist of only one 
or two individuals, without an office space. Capacity does vary from province to province, 
but several respondents indicated that some CPAEAs receive more resources (from donors 
and provincial governments) than others.  
There is also an almost total lack of vertical coordination between WASH actors at the 
national and provincial level, as well as village/community level, which WASH sector 
actors fear is only likely to worsen with decentralisation reform.25 According to respondents 
at UNICEF, the decentralisation reform ‘will make our life harder; it has already slowed 
down our activities a lot this year’.26 It will take time before all changes are effective, staff 
are allocated to the new administrative posts, and bank accounts are opened. At the same 
time, interviewees in the Katanga recognised that the decentralisation reform could have 
some positive impacts on staffing in parts which have been underserved.27 
At the national level, WASH development interventions are highly fragmented and there is 
little coordination between development actors. A Donor Group on Water and Sanitation 
(GIEA) exists at the national level. The group, which includes major donors (such as the 
World Bank, DFID and UNICEF) focuses on identifying common solutions to address 
particular bottlenecks that come up in their interventions, for example in terms of their 
relationship with the government. The GIEA is providing ongoing support to water sector 
reforms and more recently it has discussed supporting the REGIDESO in order to find a 
solution to the non-payment by government of its water invoices which totals nearly $84 
million.28 However, government and implementing partners are only invited from time to 
time to join these meetings, depending on the specific topic under discussion. Options for 
involving NGOs were viewed as limited: there is no formal body representing all NGOs 
operating in DRC; inviting them all to meetings would prove unfeasible from a logistical 
point of view, and inviting some but not others would bias procurement processes and 
create factions within the sector.  
In the absence of the strong leadership, resources, mandate and capacity that the CNAEA 
would require to fulfil its mandate as a coordinating agency, the WASH Cluster has been 
the main coordination mechanism for WASH humanitarian interventions at the national and 
provincial level.29 The OCHA humanitarian clusters are composed of UN agencies in 
cooperation with humanitarian NGOs and are split into eight thematic areas. The clusters 
were created in 2006 and are intended to facilitate better working with actors in the sector. 
UN OCHA prepares humanitarian cluster action plans, and presents them to the 
government, although the government does not participate in the cluster activity. 
Humanitarian actors (especially agencies and NGOs) work extensively in the clusters, but 
there appears to be limited collaboration between the different clusters. The WASH Cluster 
is led by UNICEF, which also manages the nutrition, education, and non-food items 
clusters, while the WHO is responsible for health and the FAO and World Food Programme 
(WFP) for food security. There is no early recovery cluster.  
 
 
23 Information from interviews with CNAEA respondents, held in Kinshasa on 4 September 2015. 
24 Information from interviews, held in Kinshasa from 31 August to 4 September 2015. 
25 Interview with Min of Health Kinshasa and others in Katanga, conducted in September 2015. 
26 Interview with UNICEF representative, held in Lubumbashi on 16 October 2015. 
27 Interview with representative of Division of Hygiene in the Ministry of Health, held in Lubumbashi on 14 
October 2015.  
28 Information from interviews, held in Kinshasa from 31 August to 4 September 2015. 
29 Information from interviews with development partners, held in Kinshasa from 31 August to 4 September 2015. 
  
 
The national WASH Cluster represents a single coordination mechanism for implementing 
partners in the humanitarian sector, but no equivalent exists for the development actors.30 At 
the national level in Kinshasa the cluster meets once a month and few development actors 
appear to participate actively – whether bilateral donors, INGOs or NNGOs. For example, 
DFID noted that they follow the WASH Cluster from afar; BTC, an important player in the 
rural water supply sector, said that they were not really invited to participate in the cluster 
and that there was a lack of symbiosis with their work. An NNGO, ADIR, also indicated 
that they had participated in the national WASH Cluster in Kinshasa but that they did not 
feel the preoccupation with discussing emergencies in the provinces (i.e. cholera, population 
movements) was relevant for their work. Their main objective is to address the endemic 
problems facing WASH in Kinshasa and in sustainable WASH development, which they 
did not feel received attention in Cluster meetings. 
 
The WASH Cluster also has a presence at the provincial level. In the provinces, where there 
are, in most cases, both humanitarian and development interventions in WASH, the WASH 
Cluster appears to be well established and has links with the development world. SNV is a 
member of the WASH Cluster at the provincial level and noted that at that level there is not 
really a distinction between humanitarian and development ‘communities’. This was echoed 
by other WASH-sector actors.  
 
In Katanga, respondents reported that because many of the participating NGOs have a 
double mandate, being involved in both humanitarian and development interventions, and 
because UNICEF is leading on the VEA programme, the WASH Cluster ends up discussing 
all WASH activities. Government representatives also attend the cluster meetings.31 
Respondents in Katanga reported that out of all the humanitarian clusters the WASH 
Cluster is one of the most functional. This is largely attributed to the leadership of UNICEF, 
which not only coordinates but also has an active role in funding and implementing 
projects: ‘This gives UNICEF a good overview and understanding of what is going on, and 
gives WASH Cluster members incentives to comply with the cluster requirements, as this 
opens the doors to funds.’32 A UNICEF representative said: ‘The WASH Cluster could be 
well-positioned to eventually facilitate a transition to development, it should be its exit 
strategy.’33 However, for now it remains part of the humanitarian aid architecture, which 
means that the approach it encourages its members to take through funding allocation will 
tend to remain a short-term one.  
In Katanga, an additional issue for coordination is the role of large companies. Despite the 
increasing role that mining companies play in delivering WASH services (see Box 6), these 
do not appear to coordinate with other WASH actors. For example, the Director of Social 
Development at MMG said that they collaborate with UN agencies and work with local 
NGOs to implement their projects on the ground. However, coordination is not very good: 
‘the private sector is accountable to itself; we are not called to report our WASH 
interventions in the WASH Cluster, for example, nor to the government. To be honest, 
coordination does not really matter: there are so many needs, and so little is being done that 
it will be very difficult anyway for two actors ending up doing the same things in the same 
place.’34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 Interview with DFID representatives, held in Kinshasa on 3 September 2015. 
31 Interview with representative of CPAEA, held in Lubumbashi on 16 September 2015. 
32 Interview with representative of international NGO, held in Lubumbashi on 15 September 2015. 
33 Interview with UNICEF representative, held in Lubumbashi on 16 September 2015. 
34 Interview with Director of Social Development Programme at MMG, held in Kinsevere on 17 September 2015. 
  
Box 6: Mining companies delivering WASH services in Katanga 
Over the years, several multinational mining companies have invested in 
Katanga in search of minerals including copper. Many companies have social 
development programmes and interventions. The 2002 Mining Code, a key 
governance framework for the mining sector in DRC, makes a miner liable for 
any damages it causes that may affect the rightful occupants of the land on 
which it mines. Mining companies are also required to support infrastructure 
projects, such as roads, schools and hospitals (KPMG 2014).  
MMG, a mining company in Kinsevere, set up a sustainability programme which 
includes delivering WASH services in villages close to operations. MMG report 
investing between $2.5 and $4 million a year in social development 
programmes – $200,000 of which go into WASH supply and service delivery. 
This has involved drilling boreholes and constructing water pumps and water 
tabs in 30 villages, benefiting 40,000 people. MMG also report supporting the 
establishment of water committees and providing training to villages to maintain 
and operate the water points. Users are required to pay a small water fee on 
the grounds that this will enable the communities to buy spare parts and repair 
pumps when they break. Out of 22 communities, 16 are reported to have active 
water committees that regularly collect water fees and put them into common 
deposits. 
This apparent success was attributed in part to the flexibility of the working 
model and the fact it was not accountable to any particular donor: ‘We could be 
ambitious: first of all, our budget is nothing like that of NGOs – we can afford to 
take more risks as we do not have to report on results, we are accountable to 
ourselves; secondly, we can hire international and national experts that design 
and deliver our projects, to ensure they are always at the highest standard.’  
The area in which MMG operates is also relatively stable. Epidemics in in the 
area have been limited to measles in 2010 and cases of cholera that were 
contained. Some preventive or preparedness measures have been taken, such 
as water tanks in villages in case water pumps break down. For this private 
sector actor, the problem appears less daunting than others interviewed: ‘It was 
quite straightforward: we provided the infrastructure, made sure it worked, and 
already reduced the incidence of illnesses in the communities of a great deal’, a 
respondent from MMG said. 
Of course, significant challenges remain. The villages around the MMG site 
attract many people from other parts of the province, who hope to work for the 
mining company. Therefore, the infrastructure that is put in place often 
becomes insufficient to satisfy all the needs, and deforestation has increased. 
Also, the fact that people very often move between villages in search of jobs 
means that ownership is difficult to achieve: ‘You train a person, you can be 
sure he or she is gone the month after.’ And finally, the management of the 
water use fees can cause conflicts within communities, and especially between 
the chief of village and the people (‘money gets stolen very easily’). 
 
Source: Authors, based on interviews with members of the MMG Social Development 
Programme held in Kinsevere on 17 September 2015 
 
Table 2 summarises characteristics of ‘typical’ humanitarian and development 
WASH approaches in DRC – as deduced from the interviews and discussions with 
stakeholders. A note of caution is needed, as in practice the two categories often 
overlap: humanitarian funding may go to projects that have some development traits, 
and vice versa, as the more detailed cases considered in this section illustrate. 
 
  
Table 2: Typical humanitarian and development WASH 
approaches in DRC  
Humanitarian WASH in DRC Development WASH in DRC 
‘Saving lives’ imperative and meeting urgent 
needs: focus on rapid service delivery, e.g. 
emergency WASH support to IDPs and conflict-
affected and vulnerable host communities, 
lifesaving WASH to crisis affected IDPs and 
returnees, prepositioning of core pipeline 
WASH emergency supplies to enhance the 
sector’s preparedness and response 
VEA programme focused on supporting 
ownership and participation in service delivery 
of government stakeholders 
 
Also projects aimed at implementing 
behavioural change programmes (hygiene 
promotion campaigns, prevention of gender-
based violence), capacity-building to and 
collaboration with governmental authorities (to 
set up enabling framework, build capacities and 
expertise), and building, maintaining, repairing 
WASH infrastructure 
South and North Kivu, Eastern Province and 
Katanga (rural and urban) 
Most provinces covered (VEA especially 
Equateur, Katanga, Eastern/Western Kasai); 
focus is rural 
Short-term programming: 3-6 months, simple 
monitoring and evaluation requirements, 
focused on results (e.g. # of people reached) 
Long-term programming cycle: 3-5 years, 
complex logframe/theory of change, M&E 
focused on outputs, outcomes and impacts 
CHF, CERF and bilateral donors UNICEF, World Bank, European Union, 
bilateral donors 
Strategy based on HRP, coordination in WASH 
Cluster (led by UNICEF) 
Interventions coordinated through WASH 
Consortium and Donors’ group  
UN agencies and INGOs partner with NNGOs 
to implement interventions (direct 
implementation in some cases); government is 
often ‘by-passed’, focus is more on rapid 
service provision than ownership and capacity-
building 
UN agencies and INGOs work with NNGOs 
and civil society organisations (CSOs), 
partnerships with government (at national and 
provincial levels); investments in capacity-
building 
Source: Author. Information from desk-based research and in-country interviews.  
  
4. Structural 
determinants of the 
siloes in DRC 
 
Fundamentally, the humanitarian and development worlds struggle to work together in 
DRC. An external evaluation of the RRMP Program in DRC conducted in 2013 noted that 
‘in sectors like WASH the connections between humanitarian and longer-term interventions 
are missing’ (Baker et al. 2013). Because of the protracted nature of the crisis in DRC, the 
one-time assistance provided by humanitarian interventions is rarely sufficient to meet the 
needs of the population, including displaced and returnee communities, At the same time, 
many development actors end up undertaking short-term interventions to face recurrent 
crises that occur in the course of their programming, for example due to an outbreak of 
cholera, or the recurrence of instances of conflict. Finding ways for humanitarian and 
development WASH interventions to operate in complementary ways in contexts defined by 
recurrent and often constant crisis would help address the needs of the beneficiaries (the 
population) in a more consistent and effective way, saving their lives when needed, but also 
building or reinforcing their capacity to withstand and respond to future crises, thus 
reducing their vulnerability. To this end, we argue that strategic collaboration between 
WASH actors, rather than mere coordination of interventions, is required – to define a 
common long-term strategy within which both development and short-term emergency 
interventions are inscribed. 
 
In this section we consider the underlying structural reasons why the lack of 
complementarity exists and persists. 
 
4.1 Geographic and thematic separation keep the communities 
apart 
Humanitarian and development interventions in DRC are geographically polarised. The 
immense size of the country and its lack of transport infrastructure has led to a 
concentration of humanitarian action in the eastern part of the country; in many cases 
decision-making centres for humanitarian interventions are located in the east, whilst 
management and strategy level staff for development agencies tend to be based in Kinshasa. 
Moreover, humanitarian staff, even at management level, are located closer to field 
operations (with bases in the provinces) than staff of development-oriented agencies, who 
are typically based in Kinshasa.  
 
Humanitarian and development actors also tend to focus on different aspects of the WASH 
sector (see Table 2 above): provision of emergency water and sanitation access to IDPs, 
returnees and populations during crises for the former, and building the infrastructure and 
capacity of governments, communities and other service delivery actors to provide WASH 
to their populations for the latter. Historically, outside of the government VEA programme, 
development donors typically focus on WASH governance in the urban environment, a sub-
sector in which humanitarian organisations rarely intervene.35 Very often, humanitarian 
 
 
35 Interviews, held in Kinshasa from 31 August to 4 September 2015. 
  
organisations intervene in areas where there are no development interests. This has left 
serious ‘gaps’ in areas which have received no development assistance and where 
communities are particularly vulnerable to health epidemics and food insecurity, increasing 
their vulnerability to crises requiring humanitarian intervention. Specific bilateral and 
multilateral donors also have particular geographical and thematic focuses. For example, 
DFID concentrates its intervention in DRC in a number of provinces, while BTC focuses on 
the rural water supply sub-sector.  
 
The geographic and thematic focus adopted by both humanitarian and development 
stakeholders is arguably a natural response to the overwhelming scale of the country and its 
needs, but without adequate structures for interaction, it tends to result in gaps or counter-
productive overlaps. Several interviewees expressed a view that the concentration of 
humanitarian operations in eastern DRC is reducing the envelope available for crises in 
other regions. Stakeholders in Katanga, meanwhile, thought that the area was being 
overlooked because of its perceived mineral wealth, despite frequent WASH challenges and 
cholera outbreaks: ‘Donors here are not keen on funding neither emergency interventions, 
nor development projects… there is conflict also in Katanga, but the government does not 
want to talk about it, for fear of discouraging investors. This is true for WASH but also for 
other sectors like education. At the meetings of the education cluster sometimes nobody 
shows up.’36  
 
4.2 Emergencies are defined mechanistically in the face of 
overwhelming needs 
The ways in which the humanitarian and development communities define ‘emergencies’ 
differ substantially. The government respondents interviewed for this study did not appear 
to have a strong independent view of what constitutes an emergency with a tendency to 
define ‘emergencies’ in alignment with those issues that humanitarian organisations are 
willing to respond to. For example, the humanitarian community considers that areas where 
there are no natural disasters are not a priority for aid – so, for example, while flooding and 
the food insecurity it creates is considered a crisis, generalised food insecurity is not.37 In 
contrast, some development actors like ADIR argue that on-going food insecurity 
constitutes a state of permanent emergency. There are examples of development-oriented 
NGOs that are trying to address the underlying causes of cholera but are unable to find 
funding through humanitarian funding streams because this is not considered an 
emergency.38 This is also true for urban water supply. Interviewees from ADIR noted that 
prior to 1999 there were only 6-7 million people in Kinshasa. Since the war, the population 
of the capital has increased to 10 million people and this has placed incredible stress on an 
already dated, insufficient and malfunctioning urban water supply system. As a result, 
indicators with respect to water and sanitation are deteriorating rapidly. ADIR is highly 
critical of the tendency of humanitarian organisations to focus solely on displacement of 
people to camps and not those who move to urban areas. This is a view shared by 
interviewees from other agencies such as the World Bank who think that humanitarian 
actors ought to view lack of water as a chronic emergency.  
 
The WASH Cluster strategy does, however, recognise community resilience as a cross-
cutting theme for all its activities, and commits to linking its exit strategies with 
development programmes (UNICEF 2015). Some activities listed to this end are developing 
a local market for chlorine products, building the capacity of local civil society 
organisations, and reinforcing the public system for the management of epidemics like 
cholera. 
 
The scale of need is clearly such that prioritisation must be done rapidly, on the basis of 
imperfect criteria. Nonetheless, the bureaucratic definition of what is and is not an 
emergency does appear to limit the ability of implementing partners to address more 
 
 
36 Interview with programme manager at AIDES, held in Lubumbashi on 18 September 2015. 
37 Interviews held in Kinshasa from 31 August to 4 September 2015. 
38 Interviews held in Kinshasa from 31 August to 4 September 2015. 
  
systemic problems, despite the apparent commitment to integrating resilience and 
developing exit strategies.  
 
4.3 Nascent integration and coordination at the operational level 
impeded by separation at the strategic level 
While there are many NGOs that work across the humanitarian and development spectrum, 
there are no formal links at the strategic level, nor coordination which would facilitate a 
meaningful transition between the departure of humanitarian organisations and the arrival of 
development actors. Even within organisations which straddle both ‘communities’ (e.g. 
UNICEF), individuals, teams and organisations undertaking WASH interventions do not 
often collaborate. Humanitarian and development sector staff are different individuals with 
different mandates, sitting within different departments.  
 
Particularly in the provinces, actors implementing donor-funded development programmes 
do participate in the WASH Cluster. However, their participation in these meetings does not 
appear to facilitate discussions around how humanitarian strategies could contribute to 
support longer-term outcomes of a more ‘developmental’ nature. WASH Consortium 
stakeholders argued that they do attempt to bring up development issues during these 
meetings.39  
 
While a donor coordination mechanism exists in the form of the GIEA, coordination at this 
critically important level remains unconvincing and, most importantly, does not translate 
into effective collaboration between the different actors. Fundamentally, while the various 
bilateral donors may agree on what they would like their end objective to be, their priorities 
and strategies of how to achieve these objectives differ widely depending on their own 
governments’ positions.  
 
There is also little interaction between the eight humanitarian clusters including those which 
are closely interlinked with WASH, such as food security and health. The way data is 
collected and recipients are defined in the different clusters and in different organisations 
does not facilitate comparative and complementary working. For example, the FAO and 
UNDP work at the community level and therefore they target ‘communities’. However, the 
WASH sector typically counts the number of people who potentially have access to water 
from an intervention, or receive sanitation or hygiene promotion, and thus target ‘people’ as 
beneficiaries. OCHA is trying to promote more multi-sectoral interventions by establishing 
better links between sectors (clusters). Nevertheless, in practice this has resulted in OCHA 
knowing who is doing what, where and when, but this not translating into better integration 
across the various clusters’ work. OCHA reportedly does not identify cross-cutting 
priorities which would really assist with coordination.40  
 
Finally, there appears to be little coordination between implementing NGOs (and 
particularly humanitarian NGOs) and stabilisation actors such as the UN mission, 
MONUSCO. Many areas in North Kivu, for example, are under the mandate of 
MONUSCO, which can create problems for humanitarian organisations working there as 
humanitarian principles prohibit collaboration with armed groups. MONUSCO has a 
Humanitarian Coordinator, but it is not clear what the role entails. A respondent from SIDA 
noted that they do take guidelines from MONUSCO but that they regularly take stock of the 
situation. UNICEF noted this as a particular challenge for their humanitarian response for 
IDPs through the Rapid Response for Population Movement. IDPs were assisted for a three-
month period, but when they began returning to their village there was no follow up 
support. 
 
 
 
39 Interviews held in Kinshasa from 31 August 31 to 4 September 2015 
40 Interviews held with UNDP representatives in Kinshasa from 1 September 2015 
  
4.4 Lack of clarity and mistrust undermine potential for external 
actors to align behind government 
Coordination between external actors and the government is also poor. Development and 
humanitarian actors do engage with the government but typically through what they 
consider to be weak and ineffective coordination structures, as key respondents at national 
level pointed out. They claimed this is due to fragmented government structures, which 
makes it difficult to understand who is responsible for what. Our research indicated that 
external actors have little confidence in the capacity or willingness of the government to 
implement and coordinate programmes. Donor funding is channelled through the NGOs or 
UN agencies instead. During our interviews, agencies and implementing organisations 
frequently indicated that the REGIDESO and SNHR are inactive and that the CNAEA is not 
functioning as a coordination body and is effectively not operational. This lack of 
coordination reflects the lack of coherent leadership at the national level. Even when 
external actors do sign agreements with government the relationship is not really one of a 
partnership and there appears to be no meaningful capacity building of government officials 
at the national level to supervise and follow up projects.41  
  
For their part, the government officials we interviewed were critical of externally driven 
interventions. One respondent claimed that humanitarian organisations do not inform the 
relevant local authorities when they arrive and what their activities will involve, nor give 
them notice of when they will leave. In the Ministry of Health, one respondent said that the 
money intended for the WASH sector, including for emergency response, should be 
directed to the appropriate government ministries rather than to INGOs and that donors 
should be encouraging NGOs to work more with government so that they can strengthen 
government systems. UNICEF implements the VEA programme in partnerships with 
INGOs and NNGOs, and government officials claim that these are selected without the 
agreement of the government and with no regard for whether NGOs meet the government’s 
criteria.42 They further claim that INGOs are often completely unfamiliar with the DRC 
context on the ground and are therefore not well placed to intervene. Given these 
sentiments, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is a high level of resentment towards 
INGOs, including those from other African countries (for example Congo-Brazzaville) 
among public sector workers. Public officials interviewed complained that INGOs come to 
DRC for financial gain and that their purpose and objectives often change depending on 
where the money is, and that many implant themselves in DRC and only look for funding 
once they are there.  
 
Whatever the merits of either side of the argument, engrained mistrust and lack of clarity 
about whom to actually engage with are widespread. In addition, from the interviews it 
emerged that most governmental authorities at provincial or national level would not have 
the professional and technical capacity and resources required to conduct emergency 
response or invest in longer-term WASH at the scale required. This situation prevents even 
initial conversations towards a long-term goal of supporting a coherent, government-led 
approach within the sector. 
 
4.5 Financing for humanitarian and development interventions 
entrenches disjointed ways of working 
According to the Financial Tracking System of the UN OCHA, in 2015 DRC received total 
humanitarian funding of $431 million (of which $373.5 million was through the HRP), 
whereas $692 million had been requested to face the country’s humanitarian needs. Looking 
 
 
41 Interviews with public sector officials held in Kinshasa from 31 August to 4 September 2015 
42 In DRC, domestic NGOs must operate in conformity with the government’s official development strategy in 
order to be legally registered and hence able to operate. INGOs must enter into framework agreements with the 
relevant ministries. All INGO and NNGO activities should in theory be in line with and approved by the 
government. In the case of humanitarian interventions, however, funding goes through common mechanisms and 
INGOs directly intervene on the ground using NNGOs but bypassing the government, as some government 
representatives critically pointed out. Information from key respondents in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi in September 
2015. 
  
at the development commitments of the World Bank only, these reached $490 million in 
2015.43 It is difficult to estimate the exact amounts of funding that go into development or 
humanitarian WASH, as the lines between the two are often blurred. 
 
The Humanitarian WASH Cluster requested $79 million but only received $20 million, thus 
being able to fund only the 21% of its planned interventions.44 As development aid is not 
channelled through common funds as in the case of humanitarian aid, it is more difficult to 
come up with aggregate estimates of development WASH funding in DRC. For 
development WASH, the World Bank had committed $100 million in 2013 (no more recent 
data are available), mostly for WASH infrastructure rehabilitation and repair in different 
parts of the country.45 While humanitarian funding goes directly to INGOs that are in charge 
of setting up the intervention (which is then often implemented by local NGOs or 
contractors), development donors tend to work via budget transfers to governmental 
organisations at both national and provincial levels. Thus, for instance, DFID directs 30.7% 
of its development budget to the DRC government.46 From our interviews, it emerged that 
WASH development funding goes primarily to the Ministry of Health, as they are the 
biggest partner of UNICEF in the VEA programme; some support is also provided to the 
CNAEA and its provincial offices. However, we were unable to find data on the exact 
amounts that are transferred to different government partners, and we suspect these will 
vary a great deal depending on the province, especially after the approval of the 
decentralisation reform.  
 
Typically, therefore, cross-over between humanitarian and development funding channels is 
challenging, though some donors like SIDA and DFID appear more open to working across 
the divide. Donors such as the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and the European 
Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department were viewed as being 
focused solely on short-term emergency interventions which save lives.47 Even within 
development funding, the conditions, procedures, and modalities attached to funds differ 
enormously depending on who is providing them.  
 
In general, humanitarian NGOs are focused on immediate results, with completion windows 
of typically around three months and no more than 18. Development projects tend to have 
longer timeframes, normally 2-3 years. The procurement process for receiving funding for 
humanitarian and development interventions is also significantly different. Tenders for 
development projects tend to be more complicated and time intensive, with long delays 
between the tender being issued and the intervention actually starting (up to nine months, 
according to an interviewee from a national development NGO). 
 
The very different expectations and timeframes attached to how humanitarian and 
development WASH funding are structured play out in a number of ways, including in 
relation to staffing (short-term contracts and high turn-over rates for humanitarian 
organisations, longer-term engagements for development ones), community involvement 
and incentives (community engagement as a priority for development interventions, while 
humanitarian interventions typically involve communities less and focus on delivering 
goods and services), and how results are defined and measured (focus on outputs, outcomes 
and impacts for development interventions, less complicated monitoring and evaluation 
procedures focused on outputs for humanitarian ones). Though these differences are 
arguably entrenched by the higher-level priorities of funders, they appear to be exacerbating 
resistance between the two communities at field level, for example when the timescale 
adopted by one side is viewed as undermining the efforts of the other, and are thus 
considered separately below. 
 
 
43 Data from World Bank’s project tracker at: 
www.worldbank.org/projects/search?lang=en&searchTerm=&countrycode_exact=ZR  
44 Data from UN OCHA FTS at: https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-
emergencyDetails&appealID=1065.  
45 Data from World Bank’s project tracker at: 
www.worldbank.org/projects/search?lang=en&searchTerm=&countrycode_exact=ZR. 
46 See DFID Development Tracker website at: http://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/countries/CD/  
47 Interviews held in Kinshasa from 31 August to 4 September 2015. 
  
4.6 Recruitment approaches and performance incentives for 
staff undermine longer-term ways of working 
Several of our interviews suggest that staff employed to deliver WASH humanitarian 
projects typically do not stay very long in country (maximum one year); they are recruited 
for their technical rather than contextual expertise and receive rapid training. Existing 
recruitment and human resources policies may allow staff with the required technical 
competences to be hired, but do not necessarily support the development of appropriate 
country-specific knowledge and expertise. In addition, they do not allow staff to develop 
relationships with local and other external stakeholders. The main concern of international 
experts spending six to twelve months in a country is meeting their performance targets; one 
interviewee from a local NGO told us that they are keen to avoid ‘problems’. Development 
staff, particularly those in Kinshasa, stay longer in post. BTC’s development professionals 
argued that this creates greater accountability to beneficiaries and means that they have 
more time to understand the context in which they work. However, engaging with 
communities who are constantly on the move is extremely challenging, even for 
professionals staying longer in country. Understanding of the context is also more limited 
among development professionals based in Kinshasa, as they are less familiar with the 
needs and interventions at provincial level.  
 
According to different respondents from INGOs, the recurrent crises that occur in DRC 
make international donors suspicious of long-term commitments and stuck in a constant 
emergency response mode. In this short-term, target-driven mentality, the overall strategy is 
determined by personal and organisational remuneration and incentives, rather than shared 
goals and accountability to the beneficiaries, i.e. the Congolese population. ‘It is a system 
that functions on short-term international staff being assigned to a station and having to 
obey to some quota imperatives set in the capital. Once you declared that 50,000 people 
have been treated for cholera, you are free to go somewhere else, hopefully with a higher 
salary’, said an interviewee from an international NGO.48 ‘The development system is the 
same,’ he added, ‘…doing development takes time, and the current system does not allow 
for time; especially international organisations develop interventions without a sound 
understanding and knowledge of the context.’49 
 
Desire for rapid results also leads to a preference for international over local expertise and 
capacity. Humanitarian projects are typically delivered by INGOS, of which one 
interviewee estimated there were 160 present in DRC.50 Responses from humanitarian 
workers and government officials indicate that there is an underlying assumption that 
humanitarian INGOs know best how to respond to emergency situations. Several national 
development NGOs working in development (such as ADIR) claim to have been refused 
work with humanitarian organisations (UNICEF) because they are ‘development’ actors’ 
and are not specialised in emergencies despite the fact that they consider themselves as 
always dealing with emergencies. Whilst development programmes also often use INGOs, 
there are examples of development projects which try to embed their projects in local 
contexts and work with national NGOs and government. This is the case with VEA, 
whereby UNICEF works in partnership with the government. BTC provided another 
example of a development project working at the implementation level with frontline public 
officials and organisations like CARITAS attempting to integrate with local structures. 
There was, however, a feeling that more could be done. A representative of the INGO 
Alima suggested that international technical experts could be paired with Congolese WASH 
experts who have a deeper understanding of the political economy context.51 
 
 
 
48 Interview with respondent from international NGO, held in Lubumbashi on 18 October 2015. 
49 Interview with respondent from international NGO, held in Lubumbashi on 18 October 2015. 
50 Interviews with UNDP representative in Kinshasa from 1 September 2015 
51 Interview with respondent from Alima, conducted in Lubumbashi in September 2015. 
  
4.7 Involvement of and incentives for beneficiaries are an 
emerging point of tension 
In order to respond rapidly and achieve outputs, humanitarian WASH interventions often 
pay community members to ensure that work is completed in the shortest time possible. 
Beneficiaries are also usually provided with services and infrastructure for free (i.e. food, 
non-food items or water). This contrasts with the common approach to development WASH 
interventions, whereby voluntary inputs are required from communities. These 
contributions can take a number of forms, including community members’ time to 
participate in committee meetings, labour to build sanitation facilities or water points, or 
cash payments to generate funds for maintenance and operation. Differing approaches to 
community contributions is an issue in the WASH sector, particularly in DRC where a 
reliance on (free) emergency provision has historically deeply shaped community 
expectations. According to interviewees, humanitarian programmes in eastern DRC are 
perceived as gifts, which has promoted a system of dependency on humanitarian assistance, 
and may lead to humanitarian actors being more positively perceived by communities than 
development actors.  
 
Elsewhere in the country, SNV noted that this created challenges for VEA implementation 
in Bandudu – even with regard to behaviour-change promotion around handwashing. 
Despite the fact that handwashing is relatively low-cost for communities to adopt, SNV 
encountered resistance because communities were not being offered a direct financial 
incentive (e.g. being paid to be involved in the programme). The World Bank views the 
issue of incentives for communities as particularly acute in the rural water subsector, 
arguing that payment for water services is essential to ensure sustainable water provision 
with self-management by local communities. BTC flagged the provision of free water as a 
major problem, again in eastern DRC. The BTC programme puts in place autonomous 
water supply systems which are reliant on payment for water to support their management 
and maintenance. However, in eastern DRC BTC respondents noted that populations have 
become used to receiving water for free and do not believe they should pay. DFID also 
noted that in North and South Kivu it is very difficult to implement development 
mechanisms (i.e. those based on community involvement and contributions) because 
humanitarian approaches have become the norm.  
 
Humanitarian interventions are not limited to water trucking or purification, and may also 
involve the communities and leave permanent infrastructure without the financial or 
institutional arrangements to incentivise its maintenance. A view expressed by one 
interviewee is that humanitarian actors are essentially dodging the issue of incentivising 
communities to maintain their own facilities – either accidentally or wilfully, because they 
know the reality is too complicated. 
 
Beyond community contributions, an increasing tension was reported around differing 
incentives for specific individuals – notably community leaders. For example, some 
humanitarian WASH interventions have become accustomed to paying per diems to 
customary chief and other actors to facilitate rapid results; not only does this create 
expectations for other implementing organisations that do not pay per diems (e.g. local 
NGOs), but it also creates competition between NGOs to buy the attention and cooperation 
of local actors, who favour working with those who pay higher per diems. A DFID 
interviewee indicated raising this with the inter-donor WASH group and had tried to 
persuade the donors to agree upon a common approach to per diems.  
 
From our interviews, it appears that different approaches to payment and reward for 
communities and individuals are not just a theoretical issue, but are becoming a major point 
of contention, and possibly even resentment, for organisations that see a need to move 
towards a longer-term approach.  
  
5. Attempts to improve 
complementarity  
Our study indicated that the staff of both humanitarian and development organisations are 
aware of the differences in their approaches, tools and methods of intervention, and 
understand that it is important to bridge this gap in order to deliver better services to the 
Congolese people, respond to crises, and prevent their recurrence. Our research highlighted 
that attempts at bringing more complementarity between humanitarian and development 
WASH approaches in DRC do exist. It also demonstrated that development programmes 
can continue to be implemented in crisis contexts, and that humanitarian aid can be 
delivered in such a way as to increase the impacts and benefits of its interventions in the 
medium to longer term. There is, therefore, some scope for optimism with regard to 
improving coordination between humanitarian and development WASH approaches.  
 
Below, we present a few examples of efforts to build complementarity, either by seeking 
windows of opportunity to modify ostensibly humanitarian or development interventions at 
field level, or to tackle the more structural causes of the disconnect, of the kind identified in 
Section 4. It should be noted that our findings are based on interviews conducted in 
Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, and as such may exclude examples from other organisations 
and/or provinces. The exercise is nonetheless a useful starting point to identify what 
conditions need to be in place for delivering better WASH programmes in contexts 
characterised by protracted crises like the DRC.  
 
5.1 Humanitarian implementing organisations: attempts to 
incorporate development approaches 
An interesting case of a humanitarian WASH intervention incorporating elements that are 
more typical of development approaches is that of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) France 
in Kalémie, in Katanga.52 MSF is known for its emergency-focused work, especially in 
conflict situations (‘which makes it even more surprising to see them getting out so much of 
their comfort zone’, said one respondent from OCHA).53 In Kalémie, a city situated in an 
endemic cholera region, MSF France decided their options were either to continue spending 
$1 million a year fighting cholera epidemics by treating people and trying to reduce death 
rates, or to spend $3 million upfront to build water and sanitation infrastructure providing 
access to clean drinking water as a preventative measure. Thus, in 2011, they started a 
multi-sectoral project with a strong prevention component; activities included the partial 
rehabilitation of the water network, preventive vaccines and distribution of water filters to 
households. As of July 2014, MSF France had improved the water supply system of 
Kalémie town, distributed residential water filters in Kataki health area and vaccinated 
51,400 people against the disease. However, the project had to be suspended in November 
2014 after two consecutive attacks on MSF (MSF 2014), illustrating the very real security 
threats that inhibit this kind of initiative. Interviews with other international organisations in 
Katanga reported that now that MSF has left the area, the activities have completely ceased, 
and the situation has gone back to the 2011 levels. This would seem to point to the failure of 
 
 
52 See more information at MSF France’s website: www.msf.fr/pays/rd-congo-rdc [in French]. 
53 Interview with Head of Katanga Sub-Office at OCHA, held in Lubumbashi on 15 September 2015. 
  
the project to properly involve the communities and local institutions in maintaining this 
system, thereby hindering the sustainability of the intervention in the long term.54 
 
A case involving the Congolese NGO AIDES shows humanitarian implementers taking a 
pragmatic line on working with local actors. AIDES is a country-wide NGO founded in 
1998, whose expertise lies in providing assistance to refugees, IDPs, returnees and host 
communities during conflict and other emergencies. In Katanga, they work in eight health 
zones, including in the ‘triangle of death’55 where only few organisations are active. At the 
beginning of 2015, AIDES started a 24-month project on community resilience, funded 
under the CHF with an envelope of $2.5 million, of which $700,000 was for WASH 
interventions. This reflects the commitment of the CHF to maintain a multi-year standard 
allocation including with a community resilience component (GHA 2015). ‘OCHA was 
interested in targeting people on the move, as these are the most difficult ones to reach, but 
also the main targets to stop the spread of cholera and other epidemics’, said an interviewee 
from AIDES.56 Interviews suggested a determination both to involve communities 
(‘communities already have their own mechanisms of resilience; it is a matter of 
strengthening them’)57 and also the government and authorities at the local level, even if 
these are parties to the conflict (‘you need to make compromise, and have your beneficiaries 
in mind... applying the do no harm approach means working with the local authorities, or 
you risk worsening the conflict’).58 
 
On a similar note, World Vision reported always aiming to adopt a participatory approach, 
building on its development work. One interviewee said: ‘It is key to work with 
communities, or your project is doomed to fail. We ensure that latrines and water pumps are 
built by people in the community and that they are then involved in the maintenance; we 
pay them a small salary, give them training and even leave them some material to repair the 
pumps if they break. Then they cannot come back to us and ask to repair the pump – they 
have to do it themselves’.59 It is, however, reportedly difficult to embed capacity-building 
and awareness-raising into the short timeframe that is typical of emergency interventions. 
Part of this relates to what is demanded by the particular nature of a crisis, for example: 
‘given that cholera epidemics happen so often, we are almost sure that after one short-term 
intervention there will be another one. If you work through community structures and 
always in the same communities, you can afford to introduce some longer-term measures – 
and this can be done at relatively low cost if you know the context well, you have the trust 
of communities, and you have done a thorough risk assessment and you have clear 
mitigation measures in place.’60 Other reasons appear to relate to institutional arrangements, 
for example for funding: World Vision reported that despite having expertise in both 
humanitarian and development interventions, they find it easier to access humanitarian 
funds for their operations in Eastern DRC, as compared to other funding pots that would 
allow them to implement long-term, more sustainable and participatory approaches on the 
ground.61  
 
World Vision have also looked at integration between WASH and other areas to maximise 
sustainability and impact of interventions. In 2014, World Vision started an integrated 
programme on malnutrition and WASH in Mitwaba in collaboration with the WFP and with 
funding from the Canadian government. ‘You cannot do nutrition programmes without 
focusing on WASH too, and vice versa; understanding and addressing this linkage through 
 
 
54 Information from representative of UNICEF through personal communication in November 2015. 
55 The region between the towns of Manono, Mitwaba and Pweto in Northern Katanga is commonly referred to as 
‘the triangle of death’ due to intercommunal clashes between the Luba and Twa ethnic groups, as well as the 
continued attacks by the Mai Mai Bataka Katanga militia and ongoing fighting with the national army. Source: 
interview with several key respondents held in Lubumbashi in September 2015.  
56 Interview with programme manager from AIDES, held in Lubumbashi on 17 September 2015. 
57 Interview with programme manager from AIDES, held in Lubumbashi on 17 September 2015. 
58 Ibid 
59 Information from interview with programme manager at World Vision, held in Lubumbashi on 16 September 
2015. 
60 Information from interview with programme manager at World Vision, held in Lubumbashi on 16 September 
2015. 
61 Interview with respondents from World Vision, conducted in Lubumbashi in September 2015. 
  
integrated programming allows for interventions that have longer-term impacts even in 
unstable areas’, a respondent from World Vision said.62  
 
A final example of a humanitarian implementing partner looking at longer-term approaches 
is provided by Assistance aux Communautés Démunies (ACD), a national NGO that is 
promoting the local production and marketing of chlorine to purify contaminated water with 
the support of UNICEF. Chlorine is recognised as important not only for those reliant on 
surface water sources, but also those using who have a nominally protected source: ‘even if 
you have clean water at the water point, by the time you transport it to your house it is 
contaminated.’63 Adoption of chlorination is not straightforward. Often, the introduction of 
chlorine tablets encounters cultural barriers, such as the opposition of village chiefs. 
Subsidisation of chlorine imports, for example from Zambia, distorts the market and 
reduces the commercial attractiveness of local production. In the regions where ACD has 
piloted their new technology for chlorine production, the organisation nonetheless found 
that the number of cholera cases dropped significantly. ‘It is an easy and cheap way to get 
hold of chlorine and have clean water’, said our respondent at ACD. ‘It can work well in 
emergency situations, but also builds the managerial and marketing skills of people in the 
communities and help them understand the importance of accessing clean water.’64  
 
5.2 Development organisations responding to crises 
A first example of a development-oriented stakeholder attempting to evolve its approach to 
WASH in the face of protracted crisis is provided by SNV. Since 2012, SNV have been 
supporting the capacity building of VEA partners and local authorities through cooperation 
and partnership agreements with UNICEF. The nature of their intervention has changed 
over time in response to learning from their experience. There have been moves to better 
understand local structures to overcome the problem of local appropriation of the 
programme and to explain the variety of outcomes recorded across different committees. As 
a specific example, SNV identified that humanitarian interventions are typically better 
received by local populations because of their more rapid implementation. In view of this, 
SNV experimented with incorporating Methods of Accelerated Participatory Research 
(MARP) into the VEA programme. This method involves facilitating a dialogue that 
enables the community to identify problems, come up with solutions and mobilise resources 
to implement them (establishing implementation schedules, community cards, defining the 
scope of the interventions etc.). The process is intended to increase both visibility and 
ownership of interventions, with a quick turnaround.  
 
There are also examples of implementing organisations (predominantly INGOs) taking a 
more adaptive and learning-oriented approach, which seems to be a prerequisite for greater 
complementarity in the longer term – even if clear and attributable successes are somewhat 
rare. For example, SNV’s broader organisational approach appears to be conducive to the 
kind of learning and adaptation based on experienced described in the MARP example 
above. SNV makes use of localised contextual analysis, community approaches, coaching, 
and facilitation of peer-to-peer (Congolese) learning. SNV’s national level staff are also 
predominantly Congolese, and the organisation has had a memorandum of understanding 
with the government from the beginning, which included the development of an exit plan.  
 
Many of the NGOs that have been present in the DRC WASH sector for a significant period 
of time highlighted the importance of learning from experience, and of managing this 
knowledge internally in order to improve their interventions on the ground. CONCERN has 
historically prioritised field knowledge: it has conducted several evaluations of its own 
activities, to assess their actual impact on beneficiaries on the ground. Others organisations 
have started to focus on programmes, rather than individual projects. For example, CARE, 
despite its traditional humanitarian approach to WASH interventions in the DRC, recently 
made a strategic decision to move to longer-term programming, to which individual projects 
 
 
62 Ibid. 
63 Interview held in Lubumbashi on 14 September 2015. 
64 Ibid. 
  
could contribute. However, one respondent from CARE admitted they are now reverting 
back to rapid response approaches to cope with the protracted nature of the crisis in DRC 
because they recognise that there are times when emergency approaches are necessary.  
 
In another example, the Sustainable WASH in Fragile Contexts (SWIFT) Programme, led 
by Oxfam (partnering with local NGOs) and Tearfund in North and South Kivu and 
Maniema provinces, is investing in operational learning projects around how the VEA 
programme could be evolved and adapted for small towns and peri-urban areas. The 
programme is also funded by DFID under a payment-by-results arrangement. Implementing 
partners are required to measure the sustainability of their interventions (continued use of 
water supply and sanitation, and adoption of hygiene promotion) one and two years after the 
majority of implementation takes place. SWIFT therefore stands to generate considerable 
learning about the sustainability of WASH programming in these states, as well as about the 
contributing factors.65 
 
5.3 Collaborative approaches 
As some of the examples above highlighted, cholera prevention and response has been one 
of the areas where humanitarian and development WASH actors have successfully been 
able to undertake complementary interventions. During crises and conflicts where there are 
significant population movements and poor access to safe water and sanitation, there is an 
increased risk of epidemics such as cholera. In the DRC, cholera has become endemic in 
many regions, and particularly in eastern DRC. The government has done little to prevent 
these crises to date, but has shown some signs of willingness to act. With the support of 
UNICEF, the government produced a 2013-2017 Multisectoral Strategic Plan for the 
Eradication of Cholera in DRC – (Plan Stratégique Multisectoriel d’Elimination du Cholera 
en RDC, PSMEC). The PSMEC identifies 120 ‘at risk’ health zones in the country and 
defines a preventive and responsive approach that spans across multiple sectors (hygiene, 
sanitation, water, education, etc.) and responds to both prevention (long-term) and response 
(short-term) objectives (UNICEF 2015). 
 
The DRC WASH Consortium has established a rapid response mechanism to cholera 
outbreaks, led by Solidarités International based on their experience since 2004 in the 
broader RRM model described in Section 3. This mechanism aims at providing emergency 
funding for epidemics in areas where WASH Consortium members are already intervening. 
Importantly, the rapid response mechanism is funded through DFID’s development funding 
window. Rapid response teams are set in place to mitigate risks: they can be deployed 
within 72 hours from the identification of the first cholera cases.66 They work with the 
health zones and NGOs to decide, in a given context, how they can best intervene in the 
event of a cholera epidemic. This way, the need for humanitarian responses is reduced in 
areas that are at high risk of cholera outbreaks. There have been four cases of epidemics 
since the WASH Consortium has been running this system, and it seems to have been able 
to mitigate the scale of humanitarian response required, according to the WASH 
Consortium.  
 
The WASH Consortium planned this contingency fund from the outset in order to allow for 
a rapid response. It could be considered as a risk mitigation strategy to protect the gains 
from development interventions in areas at high risk of cholera outbreaks. The WASH 
Consortium also considered the idea of establishing a contingency fund for population 
movements. Concern, which lead the consortium, was able to find additional funding from 
another donor linked to another of the projects they lead and this contingency mechanism 
was put in place, though under the auspices of another CONCERN programme and not the 
WASH Consortium itself.  
 
Elsewhere there have been efforts to improve cross-cluster interventions within the 
humanitarian sector, which now uses more integrated approaches to support more 
 
 
65 ODI is a global partner of the SWIFT Consortium, which also operates in Kenya. See http://swiftconsortium.org  
66 For more information, see: http://consortiumwashrdc.net/laboratoire-strategique  
  
sustainable outcomes. In fact, short-term gains in one sector can be built upon by 
interventions in other sectors for amplified results. For example, Action Against Hunger 
implemented a $2 million project in 2014 aimed at improving access to WASH facilities 
while promoting economic recovery and markets towards achieving food security. The 
project was co-funded by USAID and OFDA for a period of one year. Activities started 
from providing access to WASH in an emergency mode, but aimed at having a longer-term 
development impact by linking up with activities to promote the access of the population to 
agricultural markets. Respondents reported that increased dialogue has been possible thanks 
to UNICEF, which leads the WASH Cluster but which also has strong involvement in 
development through the VEA programme. As such the cluster coordination mechanism has 
provided a space within which development actors and humanitarian actors can talk 
informally about their experiences of WASH interventions, according to key respondents 
from INGOs and NNGOs we interviewed at national and provincial levels. Local NGOs 
such as ADIR noted that this increased the receptivity of humanitarian actors to the need of 
starting a dialogue with their development counterparts, in order to improve responses.  
 
Collaboration between humanitarian and development WASH actors has been particularly 
successful at the provincial level, perhaps because there are fewer actors and interventions 
to coordinate. At the provincial level, it has also been easier to establish positive relations 
with the government than at the national level where politics is more disconnected from the 
reality on the ground. In Katanga, for example, a representative of OCHA declared that the 
relationship with the provincial government is very positive: ‘They follow our suggestions, 
and we include them in our decisions in the cluster. Last year, they even gave money to 
OCHA to fund the crisis response in Nsusu to provide shelter and protection to the 
displaced population.’67 Again, there are concerns that the decentralisation reform will 
change these dynamics, multiplying the government offices and reducing their budget and 
resources.68 The benefits of increased dialogue are already visible in the case of cholera 
response, whereby WASH actors have been able to better understand the dynamics of 
cholera transmission, and situate cholera hotspots identify appropriate solutions in both 
urban and rural areas.  
 
5.4 UNICEF 
The scale and duration of UNICEF’s work in the WASH sector, its physical and operational 
presence in the provinces, as well as its country office in Kinshasa (which gives it access to 
the decision-making process at the national level), makes uniquely well-positioned to 
encourage complementarity across the WASH siloes, both internally and among others. As 
such, we give it particular attention. 
 
In an attempt to harmonise humanitarian and development approaches with the objective of 
reducing the vulnerability of people in areas subject to recurrent crises (i.e. in the Kivus), 
UNICEF has been placing more emphasis on promoting resilience and exit strategies. It has 
also pushed for more cross-sectoral approaches.  
 
Notable among UNICEF’s broader programming is the Rapid Response to Population 
Movements (RRMP), described in Section 3, which has arguably contributed to a more 
systemic and strategic approach to humanitarian response. In 2012 it had a budget of over 
$37 million; in 2015 it received $43m, making it the largest single humanitarian response 
programme in DRC after food aid. Funded by multiple donors, RRMP delivers assistance in 
specific sectors, such as NFI, WASH, education and health with interventions that are 
usually limited to three months (Baker et al. 2013). RRMP’s strategy integrates four basic 
requirements: pre-positioned relief supplies and funding for INGOs that are UNICEF 
partners; access to additional funds when needed; a continuous capacity of humanitarian 
surveillance; and a capacity to quickly respond through pre-established partnerships and 
standby agreements. A recent review of the RRMP highlighted that coverage has been best 
where RRMP partners have a pre-existing presence and are embedded in the humanitarian 
 
 
67 Interview with respondent in OCHA, held in Lubumbashi on 15 September 2015. 
68 Interview with respondents in OCHA and UNICEF, held in Lubumbashi in September 2015. 
  
system. In addition, RRMP, and RRM and PEAR before it, have provided a space where 
innovative activities can be field-tested. There are already a number of examples of RRMP 
pilots that have been adapted and used by other agencies (Baker et al. 2013). 
 
5.5 Donors 
Most donors still prefer channelling their funding through humanitarian- or development-
specific channels and procedures. However, more recently, some have tried different 
approaches to bring more complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH 
programming, realising the limitations of maintaining two separate approaches in situations 
where emergency response and long-term programming occur at the same time. For 
example, ADIR noted that the European Commission has relaxed some of its financial 
procedures for countries affected by crises by simplifying contractual rules for equipment 
purchases, or for the recruitment of local staff. Furthermore, a number of bilateral donors 
are making efforts to facilitate the use of development funds for rapid responses to crises as 
well as extending the length of humanitarian interventions (see the above examples of 
SIDA, DFID and BTC).  
 
Other bilateral donors’ determination to pursue a long-term agenda means that there has 
been a recent drive for more strategic programming. For example, in the past, USAID’s 
humanitarian and development programmes were not located in the same geographic areas, 
with humanitarian responses taking place in eastern DRC and development activities 
implemented in other regions. However, the new USAID strategy for the period 2015-2019 
will focus on undertaking humanitarian and development interventions in the same 
geographic area in a bid to improve complementarity and synergy, and make sure that there 
is better coordination with other donors.69  
 
5.6 Overview summary 
Table 3 below summarises the lessons learned from failures and successes of the above 
efforts to build complementarity. 
Table 3: Examples of approaches to increase the 
complementarity of humanitarian and development WASH 
approaches in DRC 
WASH 
actor 
Example Factors of success/lessons learned 
MSF-
France 
Rehabilitation of water 
network in cholera 
endemic region 
 Initial high investment in infrastructure acts as a 
preventive measure to epidemic outbreaks; saves 
money in the long-term. 
 Can be done where organisation has pre-
established presence in one region. 
 However, ongoing conflict and violence can lead to 
suspension of long-term activities.  
 Lack of sufficient involvement of the community 
can lead to non-sustainability of the intervention; 
infrastructure breaks down if nobody is there to 
maintain it. 
AIDES CHF-funded project on 
community resilience 
 Multi-year standard allocation with community 
resilience component (window for long-
term/development intervention in international 
humanitarian fund). 
 
 
69 Interview with key respondent from USAID, held by Skype in July 2015. 
  
WASH 
actor 
Example Factors of success/lessons learned 
 Identify the direct causes of crises/epidemics 
(cholera): people on the move as main targets of 
intervention – preventive approach incorporated 
into emergency response. 
 Work with local government and other authorities; 
need to make compromises ‘with the beneficiaries 
in mind’. This requires an in-depth knowledge of 
and embeddedness within the local politics, in turn 
deriving from long-term presence in a region.  
World 
Vision 
Self-built latrines and 
water pumps in several 
villages in Katanga.  
 
Integrated WASH and 
nutrition approach in 
Mitwaba 
 Participatory approach, work with (the same) 
communities and through community structures to 
avoid free-riding behaviours and ensure 
sustainability of the intervention. 
 Risk assessment and mitigation measures in place 
before you start an intervention. 
 Integrated WASH and nutrition programmes for 
longer-term impacts. 
ACD Technology for chlorine 
production as a cholera 
prevention measure 
 Emphasis on community ownership and 
awareness-raising. 
 Introduce simple technologies and build the skills 
of communities to produce and use a key input. 
 Building market opportunities (and managerial and 
marketing skills). 
WASH 
Consortium 
Rapid response 
mechanism to cholera 
 Emergency funding for immediate response in 
areas at high risk of cholera epidemics. Preventive 
approach to cholera outbreaks (rather than 
emergency intervention at later stage). 
 Operates in regions where WASH Cluster 
members are already present to ensure that rapid 
response teams can be given appropriate 
resources and are effective in preventing cholera 
outbreak. 
 Contingency fund planned from the outset. 
SNV Incorporated 
accelerated 
participatory research 
into their VEA 
development 
programming to make 
outcomes more visible 
and rapid 
 Build on what makes WASH humanitarian 
interventions more appealing to populations, and 
incorporate it in development activities (VEA): more 
visible and rapid results.  
 Learn from existing programmes (humanitarian 
and/or development) but be willing to innovate.  
UNICEF Harmonise 
humanitarian and 
development 
approaches to stabilise 
areas that are subject 
to recurrent crises 
 Emphasis on promoting resilience and exit 
strategies. 
UNICEF RRMP and PEAR plus: 
to better respond to 
acute emergency 
needs in the DRC 
 Multi-sectoral to address the emergency needs of 
refugees and returned IDPs. 
 On-the-ground presence of partners embedded in 
the humanitarian system, with overall coordination 
by UNICEF. 
  
WASH 
actor 
Example Factors of success/lessons learned 
 Open up a space to field-test innovative 
approaches to increase emergency preparedness 
and prevention.  
WASH 
Cluster 
Increased dialogue 
between WASH 
humanitarian and 
development actors 
and government  
 UNICEF as lead agency acts as a ‘bridge’ between 
humanitarian and development WASH actors. 
 Visible benefits of improved collaboration, e.g. in 
case of cholera response. 
 Easier at provincial than national level (less 
diversity, fewer actors to coordinate, less 
geographical separation). 
 Involvement of local government important – 
window of opportunity to move from short-term 
emergency response to longer-term engagement. 
CONCERN, 
CARE 
Learning and long-term 
planning 
 Privileged field knowledge, conducted research 
and evaluation on its own activities (and especially 
long-term involvement on the ground). 
 Focus on programmes, rather than projects 
especially in protracted crises. 
 Importance of institutional memory. 
Source: Authors.  
  
6. Conclusion and 
recommendations 
 
6.1 Synthesis 
This paper has considered the recent history of DRC and its WASH sector, how the 
humanitarian and development WASH siloes have manifested and been maintained, and 
existing efforts to overcome ‘siloisation’. Taking a step back, we can return to the 
overarching questions which underlie our analysis (set out in the Introduction in Box 2). 
Against these questions we synthesise our findings as follows: 
 
Question 1: How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, 
programmes and approaches interact currently, and what is the story of their 
interaction up to now? 
 
DRC has been in crisis for decades, facing conflict, outbreaks of epidemics, natural 
disasters, and food crises at recurrent intervals. In this context humanitarian and 
development interventions have tended to occur simultaneously, with donors funding one, 
or the other, or both, often with geographic separation. For example, eastern DRC has 
tended to receive most of the humanitarian donors’ attention due to the various and repeated 
instances of conflict there and its geographical accessibility; other parts of the country, such 
as Katanga, have received large portions of development aid. Also the WASH sector, which 
in DRC is typically run by international organisations with little support and involvement 
from the state, receives a mix of development and humanitarian funds.  
 
We found that interaction between the humanitarian and development actors implementing 
WASH programmes and interventions in DRC is limited. Even interaction within 
humanitarian and development communities was lacking. This impacts on the level and 
quality of the WASH services that are delivered to the Congolese population, both during 
emergencies and in more stable situations and contexts.  
  
Question 2: Do individuals, teams and organisations undertaking humanitarian and 
development WASH collaborate effectively? If not, why?  
 
Due to the presence of the WASH Cluster, humanitarian interventions appear to be more 
coordinated than development ones. In the absence of a similar coordination mechanism, 
WASH development interventions are more fragmented. A clear government counterpart 
with which donors can liaise and progressively channel their funds was also missing in the 
WASH sector, and the recently implemented decentralisation reforms risk accentuating this 
fragmentation, according to our interviewees. Coordination, let alone collaboration, 
between WASH humanitarian and development actors is also challenging: 
 Horizontal collaboration at national level was found to be limited due to the nature 
of the political and institutional framework in DRC; the latter is characterised by 
unclear roles and responsibilities for WASH, resulting in fragmented decision-
making around WASH and hence budget allocation and planning. The case of 
Katanga shows that collaboration can be easier at the provincial level where actors 
are less numerous and dispersed.  
 The geographical and political characteristics of DRC renders collaboration 
between the provinces and Kinshasa difficult. Kinshasa and the provinces are often 
  
separated by large distances and communication routes and means are poor. This 
reduces the capacity of Kinshasa (government and donor country offices) to 
control the way interventions are implemented. It also reduces the capacity of 
local/provincial offices and organisations to input into planning processes, most of 
which happen at national level. This means that funds are not always allocated 
taking into account the real needs of the targeted province, community or people. 
Question 3: How are decisions made around programming and policy, within and 
between humanitarian and development WASH communities, and do decisions lead to 
effective action on the ground? If not, what are the underlying reasons?  
 
We found that: 
 There is a strong disconnect between decision-making at the national level and 
interventions on the ground. Programmatic decisions made in Kinshasa by, for 
example, donor or INGO country offices often do not reflect the real needs on the 
ground. Furthermore, agreements with ministries at the national level are unlikely 
to guarantee the collaboration and involvement of their counterparts at the 
provincial level.  
 Humanitarian organisations, in particular, are characterised by high turn-over rates, 
hampering their capacity to conduct longer-term programmes or inform their 
interventions with comprehensive socio-economic assessments and conflict 
analyses. Reporting to the country offices is not based on outcomes and impacts; 
staff of humanitarian organisations only need to report on short-term outputs, such 
as the number of people reached by chlorine delivery. This gives them little 
motivation or incentive to engage in longer-term activities. Opportunities for 
collaboration are also missed because of the programming mode of development 
organisations, which is generally long-term and heavy in monitoring and 
evaluation and other bureaucratic requirements. This means that they are often 
risk-averse about operating in the more unstable parts of DRC, where humanitarian 
organisations will tend to concentrate. 
 Decision-making in DRC is highly politicised and difficult to navigate for 
international ‘external’ organisations. The WASH sector lacks a clear and well-
defined institutional structure and roles and responsibilities are scattered between 
different ministries and at different levels. This makes interaction with government 
agencies difficult for international actors. 
 Humanitarian and development actors do not share the same definition and vision 
of what constitutes an emergency (a point that applies beyond DRC), yet often they 
end up undertaking similar activities. Conducting hygiene behavioural campaigns 
or installing water pumps in IDP camps can have implications for longer-term 
development, even if led by humanitarian agencies.  
 Separate funding mechanisms and conditions appear to lie at the core of these 
challenges. In protracted crises, there are often more similarities than differences 
between humanitarian and development work. Humanitarian and development 
funding mechanisms nonetheless reinforce binary stereotypes: humanitarian 
interventions must be short-term and supply-driven and can only report on outputs; 
development interventions are longer-term, pay attention to demand and supply, 
and should aim at development outcomes like sustainable WASH use and 
behaviours.  
 
Question 4: What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and 
complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, 
including around the institutional arrangements and operating structures and 
incentives?  
 
Even in protracted crises, we recognise that humanitarian and development WASH serve 
different needs: the division of labour between the two is fundamental. However, this 
becomes a problem when it hinders capacity to work towards a long-term common goal, 
such as the effective and sustainable delivery of WASH services to the population. It is not 
just about better coordination: humanitarian and development WASH actors must come 
  
together to agree where their objectives overlap, and work towards these with the capacities, 
expertise, and resources they have at their disposal. Our analysis highlighted several 
windows of opportunity for bringing more complementarity in WASH interventions in 
DRC: 
 Identifying a common problem and trying to find common solutions. 
Development and humanitarian WASH actors identified recurrent cholera 
epidemics as a common problem: cholera is a development problem (it can be 
essentially prevented by putting in place adequate infrastructure for the supply of 
clean water and sanitation), but it is also a humanitarian problem (cholera 
outbreaks require immediate interventions to reduce the number of casualties and 
contain the spreading of the epidemics). In Katanga, for example, this offered a 
window of opportunity for humanitarian and development WASH actors to come 
together and collaborate towards a common goal. 
 Work at the provincial level. The planned decentralisation reform has in theory 
shifted, and will continue to shift, power and resources into the hands of provincial 
governments. In addition, the political environment at the national level is very 
difficult to navigate for international donors and agencies, especially in the WASH 
sector. As such, it is possible to work towards better complementarity in the 
interventions at the provincial level. Provincial governments remain fundamentally 
detached from their national counterparts and are able to take decisions and use 
resources with more discretion. As the case of Katanga demonstrated, government 
actors can input more meaningfully into funding allocation decisions, and a 
broader range of local actors’ expertise and capacity can be harnessed.  
 
 
6.2 Towards recommendations: adopting appropriate 
perspectives 
There are two important issues of perspective which must be considered before framing 
recommendations. 
 
Firstly, the need to acknowledge the validity of difference. We have argued that in the 
WASH sector in the DRC the problem is less a ‘gap’ between humanitarian and 
development siloes, and more a lack of complementarity between them around the shared 
concern of effective and sustainable WASH. Water, sanitation and hygiene fulfil people’s 
basic survival needs and rights and are also engines of longer-term welfare, productivity 
and opportunity. Agencies must fight the temptation to simplify the inevitable trade-offs 
that arise in complex, protracted crises, and focus instead on what can be realistically 
achieved in response to both these criteria.  
 
There are, however, strong reasons for the persistence of siloes. Humanitarian and 
development aid programming and delivery have fundamentally different purposes, 
mandates and visions, which are embedded in the institutional set-ups, as well as the ‘mind-
sets’, of each community and individuals working within them. The differences can also 
become entrenched over time, embedded in arrangements that begin to appear structural, 
such as conditions and timeframes attached to funding. The siloes cannot therefore be 
overcome by ignoring their existence. Acknowledging the validity of differences, and the 
very real constraints that individuals and organisations face in delivering on their missions, 
is a first important step in constructive dialogue and efforts towards complementarity.  
 
Secondly, the need to frame recommendations at an appropriate scale. In this study we 
looked at the history of the WASH sector in the DRC, how the humanitarian and 
development WASH siloes have manifested and been maintained, and some of the recent 
efforts to overcome ‘siloisation’. In all cases, a defining theme is the geographical, social 
and economic complexity that characterises the country and the configuration of actors 
within it.  
 
In characterising structural reasons for the siloes (Section 4), we observe that localised 
efforts towards complementarity at the operational level, i.e. in provincial capitals and ‘the 
field’, are rarely adopted more widely. Lack of integration at the strategic level, primarily in 
  
Kinshasa, hampers this. There are a number of structural constraints which relate to the way 
that large, multi-province programmes are funded and designed, and to the plans and 
approaches adopted by donors at the strategic or national level. At the same time, the effects 
of poor complementarity, such as contradictory approaches to community involvement and 
contribution, build frustrations at the operational level, which further entrench the 
perception that each side is not contributing to, and may even be undermining, the efforts of 
the other.  
 
Our analysis of existing attempts to overcome siloisation suggest that there are windows of 
opportunity at both strategic and operational levels, and action is needed at multiple scales: 
in Kinshasa, in provincial capitals like Lubumbashi, and even at lower levels where 
interventions are rolled out, down to communities and households. In framing 
recommendations about how to further develop complementarity, it is therefore essential to 
do so at the appropriate level or scale. 
 
Below, we set out a number of short-to-medium proposals for action at the provincial level, 
and at the national level. In the longer term these will need to be linked together – UNICEF 
appears a natural candidate for this linking role, given its presence in both Kinshasa and the 
provincial capitals, its understanding of both humanitarian and development communities, 
and its leadership role in the WASH Cluster. This said, and although deep concerns persist 
about governmental legitimacy and capacity, encouraging and empowering the Congolese 
government to take its own leadership role within the sector must remain an ultimate long-
term ambition, to which all stakeholders progressively work. 
 
6.3 Recommendations for action at sub-national levels 
As a consequence of the history of WASH interventions in the DRC and the recent 
decentralisation reform, actual interventions are generally planned and implemented at the 
provincial and local levels, rather than in Kinshasa. Therefore, while a number of broader 
trends and challenges can be identified at the national level, it is at the sub-national level 
that efforts to achieve operational complementarity must be directed.  
 
Our starting point for this is the concept of ‘common principles for WASH in protracted 
crises’ to provide a shared basis for building operational complementarity at sub-national 
level – led from the level of DRC’s provinces. Framed as short, targeted and actionable 
statements, such common principles need to be based on whatever common ground can be 
identified between humanitarian and development communities (respecting the validity of 
difference, they should not contradict ‘common sense’ as perceived by each community). 
They should be ambitious but achievable in the given constraints of available resources and 
logistical factors, and they must provide a clear framework, without stifling innovation. 
 
The common principles that we outline below take account of some recent streams of 
thinking in programming and policy.  
 
Firstly, they reflect a growing body of empirical evidence and practical experience focusing 
on the factors that lead to improved service delivery (including WASH services) in 
developing countries, by addressing locally determined problems in politically informed 
ways, with adaptive and entrepreneurial approaches (Andrews et al. 2013; Booth and 
Unsworth 2014; Wild et al. 2015; Faustino and Booth 2015). An examination of the 
initiatives that have succeeded in pushing forward innovative ways of working suggests that 
they share some common features. For example, they apply iterative problem solving or 
stepwise learning. They also involve brokering constructive relations among key players to 
discover shared interests and smart ways of dealing with vested interests. Finally, they are 
locally led and address problems that are salient for domestic actors, rather than selected by 
donors (DDD 2014).  
 
Secondly, the idea of identifying common principles for WASH in crises also builds on a 
concept that is currently gaining ground amongst key donors, and which argues for a simple 
framework that provides a ‘bare minimum’ of guidance from which to build appropriate and  
innovative decision making. For example, DFID’s ‘Smart Rules’ (DFID 2015) offer a 
  
simplified, unified framework and manual to guide DFID staff throughout the programme 
cycle.70 Another example lies in the food security and nutrition sector, which has recently 
developed a list of 11 general principles and concrete measures that should shape 
government and development actors’ efforts to meet immediate humanitarian needs while 
building resilient livelihoods (CFS 2015).  
 
Thirdly, the concept of common principles should be read in the context of wider efforts in 
the WASH sector to define a set of core ‘collaborative behaviours’. Four such collaborative 
behaviours have been developed by the Partners of Sanitation and Water for All (SWA 
2015) and include the following:  
 
 Enhance government leadership of sector planning processes  
 Strengthen and use country systems  
 Use one information and mutual accountability platform 
 Build sustainable water and sanitation sector financing strategies. 
SWA Partners include many governments of countries that urgently need to accelerate 
progress on WASH, as well as key WASH agencies and other organisations supporting this 
endeavour. The Collaborative Behaviours represent a refinement and consolidation of the 
aid effectiveness agenda, tailored to the WASH sector on the basis of empirical research 
from eight countries. DRC is not, however, an SWA Partner as yet. Moreover, the first and 
second principles, especially, may appear unachievable in a country where there are serious 
concerns about functioning and legitimacy of governance. Despite this, the idea of 
developing Common Principles to improve complementarity between development and 
humanitarian communities can be seen as a first step in an incremental and much longer 
journey towards strong and country-led WASH sectors and the full implementation of the 
common principles. 
 
Common Principles for WASH in Crisis should be developed, deliberated and agreed by the 
stakeholders concerned. It is up to them to determine the exact content and priorities of the 
actions to follow in order to implement the Common Principles. The process should start 
with shared recognition that there is a crisis affecting the way in which WASH services are 
delivered and reach the Congolese population. Secondly, international agencies and their 
partners at the national and provincial levels should come together to understand the causes 
of the crisis, whether it can be prevented, and how it can be addressed. This will also entail 
defining who is best placed to act, depending on the level of resources, expertise and 
capacity they have. Funding and activities need to be agreed and prioritised next: donors 
should be ready to decide what to fund as well as what not to fund, especially in a context 
marked by limited funding. The presence of institutional platforms enabling this type of 
dialogue and collaboration amongst the different actors is therefore essential. For example, 
in Katanga the WASH Cluster could be the place for the debate to start.  
 
We appreciate that the abstract idea of common principles holds little meaning and so set 
out a number of illustrative examples for one sub-national area – Katanga – in Table 4. We 
developed these examples on the basis of our observations and analysis of humanitarian and 
development WASH programming in the province, and as such their transferability to other 
provinces may be limited. The illustrative common principles aim to show what we mean in 
terms of style, rather than in terms of content, as the latter should be negotiated and agreed 
amongst key WASH actors in each province, for example in the framework of the 
provincial level WASH Cluster, in collaboration with the CPAEA where possible. To put 
the principles into practice, it will be critical to set out how the various actors who sign up 
to them will be held accountable, through periodic progress assessments.  
 
 
70 The ‘Smart Rules’ are intended to ‘encourage teams to focus more on the what and how of delivery and less on 
the why and rationale; introduce leaner documentation and processes that encourage a proportionate approach, to 
help people spend their time on the right things to deliver results and effectively manage risk; bring together all the 
information we need to comply with [DFID/ UK Government] rules in one place, which saves time and increases 
compliance.’ 
  
Table 4: Seven illustrative Common Principles for WASH in 
Crisis, Katanga 
Common 
principle 
Who it applies to How it could be operationalised 
   
1. Identify common 
areas of 
intervention and 
exploit inter-
sectoral linkages 
Implementing 
partners; 
provincial 
government 
agencies; WASH 
Cluster 
In Katanga, cholera prevention and response has 
been identified as a priority by both humanitarian and 
development WASH actors. It is also the common 
topic that receives funding from both humanitarian 
and development donors. As such, it can offer an 
entry point for the two ‘communities’ to initially come 
together for integrated planning. For example, longer-
term WASH programmes could combine the 
expertise of development actors in setting up water 
and sanitation infrastructure, promoting hygiene 
practices, etc.; and the expertise of humanitarian 
actors in deploying rapid response measures to avert 
the escalation of cholera outbreaks into epidemics.  
 
2. Hold regular 
joint meetings to 
create space for 
cross-silo decision 
making 
WASH Cluster 
and/or other fora 
that bring 
together 
humanitarian and 
development 
actors  
The WASH Cluster already offers a space for debate 
and discussion between humanitarian and 
development actors in Katanga. It could be used to 
continue this debate by more formally involving 
development actors in addition to humanitarian ones, 
under the coordination of UNICEF for instance (given 
its focus on both humanitarian and development 
interventions through the VEA). Periodic update 
meetings and consultations could be increased also 
between WASH and other sectors, such as nutrition, 
health, protection, etc.  
3. Involve 
governmental 
authorities at the 
local level, and 
enable leadership 
development in the 
WASH sector  
WASH Cluster, 
provincial and 
local government 
In Katanga, international donors and implementing 
agencies consider governmental authorities in the 
health and education sectors as credible partners to 
work with (they are perceived to be more organised, 
have more expert staff and resources). These 
partnerships, already active for the implementation of 
the VEA programme, can be exploited for the 
implementation of WASH emergency responses 
too.71 Over time, involvement of water sector officials 
should also be encouraged. 
4. Collaborate with 
domestic partners 
WASH Cluster, 
NNGOs, 
Provincial and 
local government, 
corporations 
WASH Cluster members may consider sharing 
information with and involving government, NGOs 
and even the private sector (mining companies in 
Katanga) in planning interventions at provincial level; 
some of the latter have active WASH programmes in 
different regions of Katanga, and can provide 
additional/complementary resources to increase the 
impact of individual WASH interventions (both 
emergency response and longer-term 
development/resilience-building ones).  
 
 
71 For specific donors or implementing partners, diplomatic missions may be able to advise on windows of 
opportunity within a fast-evolving and contentious political situation, to engage with local government authorities 
while respecting the principles of neutrality and impartiality that are typical of humanitarian interventions. 
  
 
NNGOs and community-based organisations can 
provide important information on issues that risk 
compromising the positive outcomes of the project, 
for example around local-level governance. 
 
Note that ‘collaborating with’ does not mean 
‘conforming with’; this principle may need to be put 
into practice sensitively, and should be avoided if 
following the recommendations of local actors, or 
even providing local actors with information about 
intended interventions, would clearly endanger life or 
compromise principles such as neutrality.  
5. Engage and 
support local in-
country capacity 
WASH 
implementing 
partners 
Use local implementing capacity (e.g. NNGOs, 
domestic private sector, local government) unless 
there are strong reasons not to, in recognition of the 
fact that local partners can be more qualified to 
respond to some crises, and more likely to remain 
when international actors leave. 
6. Encourage 
continuity within 
and between 
projects  
WASH Cluster, 
implementing 
partners 
The WASH Cluster should play a role in ensuring that 
funded WASH interventions incorporate thorough 
conflict sensitivity and environmental assessments. 
‘Keep the focus on the beneficiaries’, and ensure that 
projects reflect the needs of the people on the 
ground, rather than requirements set in Kinshasa. 
 
All WASH project proposals should include, and be 
evaluated against, consideration of (i) how, where, 
for whom, and by whom WASH services are being 
delivered and what the implications are after project 
conclusion and over the medium term (e.g. 2 years);72 
and (ii) what measures can be put in place to reduce 
adverse effects, e.g. in terms of exacerbating conflict, 
environmental degradation, and population 
displacement. Higher value proposals should include 
deeper consideration based on e.g. mandatory 
conflict and context analysis. 
7. Build capacity to 
think ‘outside the 
siloes’  
WASH 
implementing 
partners 
Include training on 
emergency preparedness 
and response for key 
development WASH 
positions.  
Where possible, 
enable learning for 
relevant staff through 
exchange/ 
secondments rather 
 
 
72 The questions ‘how’, ‘where’, ‘for whom’ and ‘with whom’ provide a helpful structure to consider positive and 
negative consequences of an intervention, for example: 
 How? Can this type of intervention be done if there is: active conflict, no government counterpart or 
other legitimate authority, low security conditions (e.g. road security), high prices or lack of markets 
e.g. for spare parts, limited existing WASH infrastructure (and in what conditions?).  
 Where? What is the hydrological and geological context, what is the settlement type now and in future 
(urban/rural/small town; IDP camp/PoC/ host communities?  
 With whom? Who are potential partners, enablers and blockers to WASH service delivery? What is the 
water governance structure at local level, i.e. who is in charge, do conflicts occur around water points 
and/or other water infrastructure? Given the context and capacities/resources available, is it possible to 
partner up with other international agencies (e.g. if they have already established presence on the 
ground), communities, NGOs, local/national government, the private sector? 
 For whom? What is the level of need? What is the likely capacity of local populations to collaborate to 
support operations and maintenance? How are different groups excluded or included in the benefits and 
responsibilities of service provision? What is the potential for benefits to be captured by particular 
groups (including access to services but also rents e.g. from monopolising markets for spare parts)? 
  
Include training on M&E, 
administration and practical 
WASH skills such as 
community-based hygiene 
and sanitation promotion, 
for key humanitarian 
WASH positions. 
than one-off training 
events. 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
6.4 Recommendations for action at national level 
While we have argued that the Common Principles for WASH in Crises should be evolved 
at the provincial level to take into account the political and geographical contexts of sub-
national entities in DRC, several broad structural changes are required at the national level. 
Without these, perceived and material barriers to greater complementarity will continue to 
exist and it will be difficult to put into action any Common Principles that are developed.  
 
First, key WASH actors, and in particular donors and their government partners, should 
focus on supporting and coordinating provincial-level strategies and approaches. The 
WASH Cluster can play a pivotal role in ensuring that interventions are planned not only 
according to geographic criteria, but also to respond to real needs on the ground. This would 
enable implementing organisations to take into account the distinct regional political 
economies and enable greater flexibility for interventions to take advantage of windows of 
opportunities (i.e. localised political support for the CPAEA) and/or to focus on problem-
solving (i.e. by addressing the underlying drivers and causes of crises in specific provinces).  
  
Second, there is a need to find flexible financial arrangements that bridge the humanitarian 
and development divide by supporting interventions that respond to the humanitarian needs 
of people in crises, while supporting (or at least not compromising) their development 
prospects. We suggest that WASH donors should introduce less rigid financial rules to 
enable flexible spending on development or humanitarian activities within programmes. For 
example, they could specify a proportion of budgets in development programmes that can 
be quickly reallocated to allow for emergency response if the need arises. On the other 
hand, humanitarian donors could prioritise funding interventions that incorporate longer-
term considerations/plans or clearly show that they are successfully leveraging and building 
off existing interventions, and incentivise these through project proposal selection criteria. 
Most bilateral and multilateral humanitarian funds are currently channelled through 
common funding mechanisms. One idea could be to direct some of this funding to 
implementing partners that are familiar with both humanitarian and development 
approaches. Some organisations have expertise in both areas but find it easier to access 
humanitarian funds for their operations in eastern DRC than other funding pots that would 
allow them to implement long-term, more sustainable and participatory approaches on the 
ground.  
 
Third, there should be a greater investment in more locally led initiatives and a greater focus 
on country-based organisations which have the interest and ability to address critical 
problems. Both humanitarian and development WASH actors should consider ways to draw 
more systematically on Congolese expertise and work with local NGOs when planning and 
implementing their WASH interventions. For example, international technical experts could 
be paired with Congolese WASH experts who have a deeper understanding of the political 
economy context. This is key to identify problems and solutions that are important and 
relevant to local people, by establishing relationships in which beneficiaries, rather than 
money, are the real focus on WASH interventions. Donors and managers of pooled funding 
can incentivise this by including specific requirement for meaningful involvement of local 
partners, especially for any medium and longer-term funding (e.g. above a year’s duration). 
 
  
Finally, both humanitarian and development organisations should prioritise documenting 
their experience of WASH interventions to identify the particular conditions under which 
approaches work or do not work and whether there are particular contexts and issues in 
which various approaches work best or don’t work at all. This should aim to record 
innovative initiatives which have proved successful and which have been able to adapt to 
specific contexts to take account of sub-national and sub-provincial variations and of the 
dynamic context. Methods could range from including dedicated operational learning 
components within implementation activities, to encouraging all project managers, 
development or humanitarian, to provide brief qualitative assessments of where there have 
been successes, as part of project reporting. The objective should be to contribute to 
building an evidence base about the sorts of change processes that contribute to better 
WASH outcomes both at times of crisis and, when crisis abates or alleviates, by building 
preparedness and resilience. Learning from failure is likely to be an important element of 
this process.  
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Appendix 1: Interview list 
List of people and organisations interviewed for this study 
 
Name Organisation Position 
Interviews in Lubumbashi:   
Philippe Lwabo EHB National coordinator 
Jean Kazadi EHB Programme manager 
(Anonymous) AIDES WASH Programme Manager 
Michel Santos MMG Social Development Manager 
Dimitry Ilunga Ngoy MMG Social Development Team 
Mulaj Musasa Gilbert MMG Social Development Team 
Baudouin NYANGOMBALE SANZOU  IRC Emergency Coordinator 
Daniel Mushaga Defi Michee National Coordinator 
George Kadinga Action Contre la 
Pauvrete (ACP) 
General Coordinator 
Souleymane Beye OCHA Head of Katanga Sub-Office 
Anthony Bertrand Bonhommeau ALIMA Head of Mission 
John Shamamba Muchuba Assistance aux 
Communautes 
Demunies (ACD) 
National coordinator 
Magali Carpy Botoulou UNICEF Head of Mission 
Patrick Bilanda UNICEF WASH Specialist 
Patrick Lilombo World Vision Senior FAIRO 
(Anonymous) Health Zone Technician 
Ambroise Ilunga CPAEA/Katanga Provincial Executive Secretary 
Patrick Mbay PROVIC Health Specialist 
  
Jacques Kasake SNHR Technician 
Hugues Nsenga Ministry of Health, 
Hygiene Department 
(D9) 
SNV Focal Point 
Kinshasa interviews:   
Deo Marindi  Water and Sanitation 
Programme (WSP), 
World Bank 
Water Supply Specialist 
Elena Ferrari  
 
UNDP Early Recovery Advisor 
Dr Mavard KWENGANI  
 
Department of 
Hygiene, Ministry of 
Health 
Director 
Tolo Assad  
 
SNV  
Dominique Sowa 
 
ADIR  
Antoine Mesu  Belgian Technical 
Cooperation 
Head of WASH programme 
Dr Kebela  Ministry of Health Director, Department of disease 
prevention, 
Franck Abeille  UNICEF Head WASH Chief 
Lisa Rudge  
 
Department for 
International 
Development 
(DFID) 
WASH Advisor 
Aude Rigot  
 
UNICEF Head of Emergencies 
Francois Landiech  Swedish 
International 
Development 
Cooperation (SIDA)  
 
Stephen Jones and Amaleye Dia WASH Consortium  
Jean Claude Luyela Musiewob  
 
Comité Nationale 
des Agences de 
l’Eau et 
Assainissement 
(CNAEA) 
Director 
Modeste Zihindula  Independent WASH 
consultant 
 
 
  
  
Appendix 2: Methodology 
Study design 
We selected a sequential desk-field design for the research, whereby desk research was 
interspersed with fieldwork. The two tracks were closely interconnected, allowing the team 
to inform outputs with international good practice and thinking, as well as insights from 
case study contexts and experience of programming and policy realities. Preparatory 
research consisted of a literature review on WASH service delivery in conflict and 
protracted crises and disaster situations, coupled with consultations with UNICEF and WSP 
and interviews with key global stakeholders.  
 
Secondly, for this case study interviews were conducted in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi 
(Katanga) over a total of 10 days with UNICEF staff (at country office and field offices), 
donors, UN agencies, International non-governmental organisations (INGOs), national non-
governmental organisations (NNGOs), government counterparts, and beneficiary 
communities (in Katanga). A complete list of the interviews is presented in table A1 below. 
The choice of Katanga as project location to use as case study was made in consultation 
with UNICEF DRC Country Office. Interviews were conducted in French and then 
translated into English by the researchers. 
Two Congolese national consultants with deep knowledge and experience of the WASH 
and health sectors in DRC participated in the fieldwork, contributing to shaping the research 
focus and identifying suitable respondents.  
 
Analytical framework 
 
As noted, the research approach was inductive and iterative, incorporating a focus on 
emerging issues as they arose in the course of interviews. Guided by the overarching 
research questions, detailed sub-questions (see Annex 2) were adapted to explore a range of 
issues including institutional cultures, assumptions, values, structures and ways of working, 
principles and practices, interaction and effective collaboration, decision-making, 
institutional arrangements, and operating structures and incentives.  
 
We initiated the research with a broad conceptual approach emphasising three types of 
disjunction that give rise to and sustain the siloisation between humanitarian and 
development WASH – in accountability, norms, and institutions. These disjunctions are 
common to most service sectors, but all too apparent in the case of WASH. In emphasising 
these three disjunctions, we sought to apply, implicitly, a political-economy approach, 
rooted in understanding fundamental incentives and power differentials at organisational 
and individual levels. A starting point was the belief that it is misaligned incentives and 
imbalances of power and information that inhibit more productive outcomes for WASH 
users in poor and fragile contexts, but are, at the same time, key to unlocking such 
outcomes. 
 
We present the three original categories below (summarised from our proposal) both to 
demonstrate our starting point, and to confirm that the inductive nature of the research 
revealed considerable nuance and a need to look beyond these three overarching categories.  
 
We revisit the question of analytical frameworks in our synthesis report for this project. 
 
  
Accountability: Driven by accountability to domestic constituencies, donor governments 
emphasise short-term, easily enumerated results. In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, 
this breeds reliance on international non-governmental organisations, working directly or 
through local partner NGOs, which have the capacity and flexibility to bypass, or work 
loosely in parallel with, inadequate government structures. Where this works well, it 
provides incremental services which ultimately may be taken over by government agencies 
and communities. Where it fails, it leaves redundant and collapsing infrastructure, without 
the capacity – either in communities, the private sector, or government – to sustain services. 
Results don’t tend to come as easily (nor are they easily counted) if those same funds are 
entrusted to national governments which are struggling to establish basic bureaucratic and 
technocratic functions, including public financial management and sector monitoring and 
information systems.  
 
Meanwhile accountability to the constituency that all parties ostensibly aim to serve – end 
users – may be jeopardised. The accountability of NGOs, working through project 
modalities, to service users, is high in the short term. But over the long term, discrete 
project funding cycles close and emergency and relief organisations move on to the next 
most crisis-affected area. As they do so, the accountability gap may not be filled by 
government actors, which have been bypassed or undermined by the reliance on third 
parties. We acknowledge the fundamental challenge for donors seeking to route funds to 
low capacity environments, and the potential for non-governmental organisations to play a 
critical role in the transition from emergency relief to longer-term development.  
 
Norms: Organisational missions are accumulated over time and go far deeper than short 
statements on agency websites. OCHA’s emphasis on the four humanitarian principles – 
humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence – constitute a rational response to the 
challenges of meeting basic needs in contexts where such ideals are severely compromised 
by political oppression or violent conflict. The ability to maintain independence and non-
alignment in fast-changing political and military situations is critical to protect staff and 
service users alike. The primary purpose for such agencies, of meeting fundamental needs 
and protecting life and health, take precedence, and are shielded from the messy realities of 
building durable political settlements. But this normative approach becomes more 
challenging in a post-conflict environment. Here, the risk of crises reoccurring, and legacies 
of community mistrust of elites and officials, can prevent relief agencies from engaging 
with the groups that will, ultimately, need to assume responsibility for sustainable services.  
 
Development agencies, meanwhile, have the luxury of looking beyond the relatively narrow 
purpose of WASH to meet immediate survival needs and contain epidemics. As a country 
and its partners shift into the developmental mode, the purpose of WASH also begins to 
shift: to being a fundamental pillar of health systems, and an enabler of productivity for 
households and economies. Achieving results of this nature is still necessarily complex, and 
cannot be achieved without investment in sector systems, and the core-government systems 
(above all fiduciary management) which underpin them. 
 
So what of the middle spaces – post-conflict, or in situations of recurrent crisis where 
government maintains a skeleton presence but faces severe problems of legitimacy and 
capacity? Relief and development agencies alike acknowledge the complexity of these 
transitional phases, and the need for adaptive, iterative responses. Yet the world of 
international assistance continues to organise itself, normatively as much as operationally, 
on the basis of ‘two-sizes-fit-all’. The unpredictable nature of the fragile contexts and crises 
does, of course, force humanitarian agencies into longer-term engagement; development 
agencies can become entangled in emergency response – as exemplified by the setbacks 
experienced in South Sudan. But the fundamental challenge posed by deep-seated norms, 
within development and humanitarian communities – including about the very purpose of 
WASH (as basic need or engine of productivity and opportunity), remain urgently in need 
of better understanding.  
 
Institutions: The professional cadres which make up the development and humanitarian 
WASH communities remain fundamentally isolated from each other – their operational and 
management tiers sometimes prioritising radically different things. Funding streams are 
  
compartmentalised, not least because of the basic accounting challenge of having funds 
available for rapid deployment to emergencies versus longer-term commitments needed for 
systems-building. OCHA pooled funding – the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 
Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) and Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) – remain a 
largely unfamiliar domain for developmental WASH policy specialists, even where, in the 
case of CHFs and ERFs, pooled funding is available on a long-term, country-specific basis 
to tackle recurrent and persistent crises. Key developmental modalities of programmatic and 
budget support are, similarly, a world away for many humanitarian agencies, leaving an 
uneasy and often unsustainable middle ground of project-based funding. 
 
On the ground, while humanitarian and development professionals share similar skillsets – 
such as engineering, or social development, or logistics – they are persistently separated by 
institutional arrangements, job descriptions and recruitment policies. In part this is due to 
recognisable differences in technologies and approaches needed to meet emergency WASH 
needs versus developmental WASH needs. But the organisations involved can usefully be 
questioned on how, and why, their staffing and professional development policies reinforce 
this divide. Similar questions can be asked of the WASH knowledge and policy community, 
which does little to overcome the gap – exemplified in the apparent disconnect between 
emergency WASH technical standards (such as Sphere) and the standards monitored (and 
now proposed for post-2015) by the JMP. 
 
 
  
  
Appendix 3: Research 
questions 
National-level field work – Kinshasa 
Understanding general context/working modalities: 
 How long have you been working in DRC, focusing on what/in what regions 
(urban/rural, states, community focus)? 
 How does the crisis/health emergencies/political and violence situation on the 
ground affect the capacity of your organisation to work? (E.g. violence can 
restrict access in certain regions, military groups target INGOs’ personnel, 
etc.) What are the main logistical and other challenges you face in your daily 
work? Do other organisations have similar problems (or are there some 
organisations that for instance have better access to certain areas, have a 
better negotiating position with military/state, etc.)? If so, why might that be 
the case? 
 Who are the predominant actors in the WASH sector? State or non-state 
providers? How do you engage with them? Has the Water Law been passed? 
More generally, to what extent the national legislative/policy framework in 
the sector constrains/enables your interventions? 
 What have been the impacts of the decentralisation reform, if any? What do 
you think will be the impacts of this reform on the future of your activities? 
(e.g. more and more powerful local authorities may be easier to work with for 
delivery of services at local level, or they may constitute an obstacle, making 
your interventions more difficult). 
 At what level are you mostly operating? To what extent is your work 
community-based, and why? (Humanitarian Response Plan for DRC calls for 
community-based assessment of vulnerabilities).  
How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, programmes and 
approaches interact currently, and what is the story of their interaction up till now? 
 [For humanitarian audience] Besides humanitarian intervention, what are 
your activities/areas of work that specifically aim at development transition? 
And are you focusing on those regions that are characterised by high levels of 
conflict/violence (e.g. do you work in eastern DRC?), or do you tend to 
operate in more stable regions? What are the specific challenges you are 
addressing there?  
 To what extent are your WASH interventions contributing to institutional 
strengthening, capacity-building in WASH sector. More generally, what are 
the specific ‘development-oriented/long-term components of your WASH 
intervention in DRC? (e.g. cash-based approach, combining nutrition + 
WASH, etc.) 
 [For development audience] Besides your activities/areas of work that 
specifically aim at development what is your approach to emergency 
preparedness, resilience etc. What is your organisation’s traditional approach 
in ‘fragile/conflict states’, and how does it differ from the one you take in 
other, non-conflict contexts?  
  
 How do you work with the other 'half'? When, how and why do you work/not 
work with development/humanitarian focused sector?  
 What is the balance between meeting basic human needs and long-term 
capacity building? 
 How has capacity in your organisation varied through time? (Presence has 
augmented/diminished, more funding available, staff turnover, different 
mechanisms for coordination e.g. clusters being set up etc.) 
 Are relevant DRC government agencies/ministries involved equally in 
humanitarian and development WASH – if not why not? What are their 
perceptions about each and why?  
 Is there coordination between water, sanitation and hygiene? How is the 
WASH sector approaching coordination?  
 To what extent are you negotiating/engaging with MONUSCO and other 
belligerent parties? And the public sector at different levels (national, 
provincial)? And the civil society (NGOs, faith-based groups, others?) How 
do you think this helps you deliver your mission (in general and in terms of 
WASH service delivery in particular)? Is there a risk that these relations with 
authorities and/or any of these other actors could affect the humanitarian 
principles of independence and neutrality? If yes, how? 
 Ask about ‘Village and Ecole Assainies’. Background info; in what regions? 
What achievements/challenges so far? Have these been scaled up and if not 
why/what were the major constraints? [Useful to understand especially 
relationship/engagement with local governments] 
Do individuals, teams and organisations undertaking humanitarian and development 
WASH collaborate effectively? If not, why? 
 In your opinion, what constitutes the development and humanitarian WASH 
sector silos?  
 What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and 
complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, 
including around the institutional arrangements and operating structures and 
incentives?  
 What would be on your top priorities if you were to stay for another two 
years?  
How are decisions made around programming and policy, within and between 
humanitarian and development WASH communities, and do decisions lead to effective 
action on the ground? If not, what are the underlying reasons?  
 What scope is there for adaptive decision-making as situations change? 
(Understand underlying reasons, both at organisational and personal level 
inhibiting or enabling adaptive approaches).  
 Who/at what level do you decide where to intervene, for how long, adopting 
which approach? (e.g. at HQ, regional, country offices level) Does the 
specific decision-making process you have in place lead to effective action on 
the ground?  
 How does the crisis affect the capacity of your organisation to work? (e.g. 
violence can restrict access in certain regions, military groups target INGOs’ 
personnel, etc.)  
 What are the main trade-offs you face during your work? Who decides when 
trade-offs emerge, i.e. who takes operational decisions versus who sets the 
broader framework within which interventions take place? Do other 
organisations have similar problems (or are there some organisations that for 
instance have better access to certain areas, have a better negotiating position 
with military/state, etc.)? 
  
 More generally, what are the main limitations of your current approach 
(challenges you face)? What are you not doing well enough, and why in your 
opinion?  
 Who are the interventions for, to whom are you accountable (beneficiaries, 
donors, national government, etc.)? In your view, how does this impact on 
your operations? 
 
Provincial field work – Lubumbashi, Katanga 
Understanding general context/working modalities: 
 How long have you been working in Lubumbashi, focusing on what/with 
what objectives (to understand whether they perceive themselves as being 
humanitarian- or development-oriented, and e.g. the extent to which their 
work is related to health emergencies)? 
 At what level are you mostly operating? To what extent is your work 
community-based, and why? (Humanitarian Response Plan for DRC calls for 
community-based assessment of vulnerabilities).  
 What are the main logistical and other challenges you face in your daily 
work? Do other organisations have similar problems (or are there some 
organisations that for instance have better access to certain areas, have a 
better negotiating position with military/state, etc.)? If so, why might that be 
the case? 
 Who are the predominant actors in the WASH sector? State or non-state 
providers? How do you engage with them?  
 What have been the impacts of the decentralisation reform, if any? What do 
you think will be the impacts of this reform on the future of your activities? 
(e.g. more and more powerful local authorities may be easier to work with for 
delivery of services at local level, or they may constitute an obstacle, making 
your interventions more difficult). 
How do humanitarian and development WASH communities, programmes and 
approaches interact currently, and what is the story of their interaction up to now?  
 To what extent are your WASH interventions contributing to institutional 
strengthening, capacity-building in WASH sector. More generally, what are 
the specific ‘development-oriented/long-term components of your WASH 
intervention in DRC? (e.g. cash-based approach, combining nutrition + 
WASH, etc.) 
 And to what extent are your WASH interventions aimed at meeting basic 
needs in emergency situations?  
 What is the balance between meeting basic human needs and long-term 
capacity building? 
 How do you work with the other 'half'? When, how and why do you work/not 
work with development/humanitarian focused sector?  
 How has capacity in your organisation varied through time? (Presence has 
augmented/diminished, more funding available, staff turnover, different 
mechanisms for coordination e.g. clusters being set up etc.) 
 Are relevant DRC government agencies/ministries involved equally in 
humanitarian and development WASH – if not why not? What are their 
perceptions about each and why?  
 Is there coordination between water, sanitation and hygiene? How is the 
WASH sector approaching coordination?  
 To what extent are you negotiating/engaging with MONUSCO and other 
belligerent parties? And the public sector at different levels (national, 
provincial)? And the civil society (NGOs, faith-based groups, others?) How 
do you think this helps you deliver your mission (in general and in terms of 
  
WASH service delivery in particular)? Is there a risk that these relations with 
authorities and/or any of these other actors could affect the humanitarian 
principles of independence and neutrality? If yes, how? 
 Ask about ‘Village and Ecole Assainies’: Background info; in what regions? 
What achievements/challenges so far? Have these been scaled up and if not 
why/what were the major constraints? [Useful to understand especially 
relationship/engagement with local governments] Other examples of WASH 
integration in other sectors? 
What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and complementarity 
between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, including around the 
institutional arrangements and operating structures and incentives?  
 In your opinion, what constitutes the development and humanitarian WASH 
sector silos, with specific reference to your work in Lubumbashi, and 
experience within your organisation/WASH sector in DRC more generally?  
 What windows of opportunity exist to ensure a better connection and 
complementarity between development and humanitarian WASH at all levels, 
including around the institutional arrangements and operating structures and 
incentives?  
 What would be on your top priorities if you were to stay for another two years 
(and why)?  
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